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  INTRODUCTION   
On October 5, 2017, the New York Times broke the Harvey 
Weinstein story.1 High profile actresses including Ashley Judd 
and Rose McGowan accused Weinstein of propositioning and as-
saulting them while pursuing acting roles.2 In years past, Wein-
stein enjoyed a high level of power and prominence as a Holly-
wood kingmaker, producing blockbusters like Pulp Fiction, Good 
Will Hunting, and Shakespeare in Love.3 The Weinstein story 
kept growing as additional stars described similar experiences.4 
Weinstein was fired by his own company5 on October 8, 2017, 
 
 1. Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Har-
assment Accusers for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. E.g., Jacey Fortin, The Women Who Have Accused Harvey Weinstein, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/us/harvey 
-weinstein-accusations.html; Salma Hayek, Harvey Weinstein Is My Monster 
Too, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/ 
13/opinion/contributors/salma-hayek-harvey-weinstein.html; Lupita Nyong’o, 
Lupita Nyong’o: Speaking Out About Harvey Weinstein, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/19/opinion/lupita-nyongo-harvey 
-weinstein.html. 
 5. Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Is Fired After Sexual Harassment Re-
ports, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/08/business/ 
harvey-weinstein-fired.html. 
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which later declared bankruptcy.6 He has since been arrested on 
rape charges.7  
On October 15, 2017, actress Alyssa Milano asked her Twit-
ter followers to reply with the hashtag #metoo if they had expe-
rienced harassment or assault.8 Her tweet went viral, and the 
#metoo hashtag has since been used over twelve million times.9 
Although Milano’s tweet brought global attention to the MeToo 
movement, it originated from activist Tarana Burke.10 Burke 
started the movement in 200711 and used the term “metoo” to 
express solidarity with girls and women who experienced sexual 
assault.12 
In the weeks and months following the Weinstein revela-
tions, a number of prominent men in media, journalism, and pol-
itics were accused of harassment or assault, often by multiple 
women.13 These included television hosts Charlie Rose,14 Matt 
 
 6. Brooks Barnes, Weinstein Company Files for Bankruptcy and Revokes 
Nondisclosure Agreements, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2018/03/19/business/weinstein-company-bankruptcy.html. 
 7. Benjamin Mueller & Alan Feuer, Arrested on Rape Charges, Weinstein 
Posts $1 Million Bail, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/05/25/nyregion/harvey-weinstein-arrested.html. 
 8. Sophie Gilbert, The Movement of #MeToo, ATLANTIC (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2017/10/the-movement-of 
-metoo/542979. 
 9. Emma Brockes, Me Too Founder Tarana Burke: ‘You have to Use Your 
Privilege to Serve Other People,’ GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www 
.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/15/me-too-founder-tarana-burke-women 
-sexual-assault. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Sandra Garcia, The Woman Who Created #MeToo Long Before 
Hashtags, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/us/ 
me-too-movement-tarana-burke.html. 
 12. Brockes, supra note 9. 
 13. See, e.g., Dan Corey, A Growing List of Men Accused of Sexual Miscon-
duct Since Weinstein, NBC NEWS (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
storyline/sexual-misconduct/weinstein-here-s-growing-list-men-accused-sexual 
-misconduct-n816546. 
 14. John Koblin & Michael Grynbaum, Charlie Rose Fired by CBS and PBS 
After Harassment Allegations, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2017/11/21/business/media/charlie-rose-fired-cbs.html. 
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Lauer,15 and Tavis Smiley;16 several high ranking hosts at Na-
tional Public Radio;17 and Disney producer John Lasseter.18 All 
but Lasseter were fired.19 Actor Kevin Spacey was accused of as-
saulting a 14-year-old boy.20 Comedian Louis CK was accused of 
lewd conduct by fellow comedians and coworkers.21 Chefs Mario 
Batali and John Besh were likewise accused of harassment.22 
Twenty-five women at Besh’s company described a hostile work 
environment where complaints were ignored.23 Multiple male 
models accused prominent photographers Mario Testino and 
Bruce Weber of sexual misconduct.24 
The MeToo movement also reached politicians in federal and 
state government. Senator Al Franken, Representative Blake 
Farenthold, and Representative John Conyers resigned in the 
wake of harassment allegations.25 These accusations revealed an 
arcane system for handling harassment complaints in Congress, 
 
 15. Ellen Gabler et al., NBC Fires Matt Lauer, the Face of ‘Today,’ N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/business/media/ 
nbc-matt-lauer.html. 
 16. Andrew Dalton, New Witnesses Allege Sexual Misconduct by Tavis Smi-
ley, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 23, 2018), http://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
entertainment/tv/ct-tavis-smiley-sexual-misconduct-allegations-20180323 
-story.html. 
 17. See Camila Domonoske, Garrison Keillor Accused of ‘Inappropriate Be-
havior,’ Minnesota Public Radio Says, NPR (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.npr 
.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/11/29/567241644/garrison-keillor-accused-of 
-inappropriate-behavior-minnesota-public-radio-says; Patrick Hipes, NPR’s ‘On 
Point’ Radio Host Tom Ashbrook Fired, DEADLINE HOLLYWOOD (Feb. 14, 2018), 
https://deadline.com/2018/02/tom-ashbrook-on-point-host-fired-npr-wbur 
-boston-university-1202288818; Mike Snider, NPR News Chief Michael Oreskes 
Resigns After Sexual Harassment Accusations, USA TODAY (Nov. 1, 2017), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/media/2017/11/01/npr-news-chief 
-michael-oreskes-resigns-after-sexual-harassment-accusations/821405001. 
 18. Steven Zeitchik, Disney Animation Guru John Lasseter Takes Leave Af-
ter Sexual Misconduct Allegations, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2017/11/21/disney-animation-guru 
-john-lasseter-takes-leave-after-sexual-misconduct-allegations. 
 19. Dalton, supra note 16; Domonske, supra note 17; Gabler, supra note 15; 
Hipes, supra note 17; Koblin & Grynbaum, supra note 14; Snider, supra note 
17; Zeitchik, supra note 18. 
 20. Corey, supra note 13. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Brian Stelter, Vogue Publisher Drops Bruce Weber and Mario Testino 
over Misconduct Allegations, CNN (Jan. 15, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/ 
01/15/media/mario-testino-bruce-weber-conde-nast/index.html. 
 25. Dan Corey, Here’s a List of Political Figures Accused of Sexual Miscon-
duct, NBC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/sexual 
-misconduct/here-s-list-political-figures-accused-sexual-misconduct-n827821. 
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where complainants26 were forced to continue working with the 
harasser during a thirty-day cooling off period.27 Former Judge 
Roy Moore lost a heavily contested Alabama Senate race after 
several women accused him of aggressively pursuing them as 
teenagers.28 Prominent politicians in state politics were likewise 
accused of harassment.29  
The MeToo movement galvanized complaints in other indus-
tries.30 Alianza Nacional de Campesinas wrote an open letter of 
solidarity to women in Hollywood, noting endemic problems of 
harassment in agriculture.31 The New York Times published an 
exposé of decades of harassment and related litigation in an auto 
plant.32 MeToo reinvigorated complaints about widespread har-
assment and assault of hotel workers.33 It also brought renewed 
attention to Silicon Valley, where programmer Susan Fowler’s 
accusations of harassment at Uber went viral earlier in 2017.34 
 
 26. I generically refer to employees accusing other employees of harass-
ment as “complainants,” and on occasion, “plaintiff ”  in the context of legal dis-
putes. For purposes of reader fluency, I refer to complainants as “victims” in 
recounting salient events from the MeToo movement or to more clearly distin-
guish a complainant from the accused employee. 
 27. Rachael Bade & Elana Schor, Capitol Hill’s Sexual Harrassment Policy 
‘Toothless,’ ‘A Joke,’ POLITICO (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/ 
2017/10/27/capitol-hill-sexual-harassment-policies-victims-244224. 
 28. Greg Price, Revenge of #MeToo? How Sexual Assault, Child Molestation 
Claims Destroyed Roy Moore in Alabama, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 13, 2017), https:// 
www.newsweek.com/metoo-alabama-women-vote-jones-746591. 
 29. Joel Ebert, Sexual Harassment Troubles Mount in Statehouses Around 
the Country, USA TODAY NETWORK (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/nation-now/2017/11/20/sexual-harassment-statehouses/882874001. 
 30. See, e.g., A. Elaine Lewis, Who Is at Highest Risk of Sexual Harass-
ment?, ACLU (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/womens 
-rights-workplace/who-highest-risk-sexual-harassment. 
 31. 700,000 Female Farmworkers Say They Stand with Hollywood Actors 
Against Sexual Assault, TIME (Nov. 10, 2017), http://time.com/5018813/ 
farmworkers-solidarity-hollywood-sexual-assault. 
 32. See Susan Chira & Catrin Einhorn, How Tough Is It to Change a Cul-
ture of Harassment? Ask Women at Ford, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2017), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/19/us/ford-chicago-sexual-harassment 
.html. 
 33. See, e.g., Dave Jamieson, ‘He Was Masturbating . . . I Felt Like Crying’: 
What Housekeepers Endure to Clean Hotel Rooms, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 18, 
2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/housekeeper-hotel-sexual 
-harassment_us_5a0f438ce4b0e97dffed3443. 
 34. Maya Kosoff, The Toxic Backlash of Silicon Valley’s Boys’ Club, VANITY 
FAIR (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/12/the-toxic 
-backlash-of-silicon-valleys-boys-club. 
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The MeToo movement also revealed the ways in which the 
law can be misused to enable and conceal harassment.35 Wein-
stein successfully covered his tracks for decades using contracts, 
threats, and a powerful network.36 Weinstein entered into mul-
tiple settlement agreements containing non-disclosure and non-
disparagement provisions.37 In some cases, these agreements 
not only prohibited the victim from disparaging Weinstein, but 
forced her to speak about him in a positive manner if contacted 
by the press.38 On other occasions, Weinstein threatened to de-
stroy victims’ reputations if they spoke out.39 One victim called 
the police and successfully recorded an apparent admission by 
Weinstein on tape.40 Nevertheless, Weinstein appears to have 
successfully used his influence to end the investigation.41  
Time Magazine declared the MeToo movement its Person of 
the Year.42 The movement has continued into 2018 and was fea-
tured prominently at the Golden Globe awards, where Oprah 
Winfrey applauded women for sharing their truth, and promised 
young girls “that a new day is on the horizon.”43 
Inevitably, the movement leads to the question of what 
comes next.44 The Time’s Up Initiative, led by prominent lawyers 
 
 35. Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1 (providing an example of how Harvey 
Weinstein misused the law to enable and conceal harassment). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Times Reporters Describe How a Paper Trail Helped Break the Wein-
stein Story, NPR (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/ 
transcript.php?storyId=564310240. 
 39. Sara Moniuszko & Cara Kelly, Harvey Weinstein Scandal: A Complete 
List of the 87 Accusers, USA TODAY (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/life/people/2017/10/27/weinstein-scandal-complete-list-accusers/ 
804663001. 
 40. See Ronan Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault: Har-
vey Weinstein’s Accusers Tell Their Stories, NEW YORKER (Oct. 10, 2017), https:// 
www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/from-aggressive-overtures-to-sexual 
-assault-harvey-weinsteins-accusers-tell-their-stories. 
 41. See id. 
 42. Jonah Bromwich, ‘The Silence Breakers’ Named Time’s Person of the 
Year for 2017, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/06/ 
business/media/silence-breakers-time-person-of-the-year.html. 
 43. Sophie Gilbert & Tori Latham, Full Transcript: Oprah Winfrey’s Speech 
at the Golden Globes, ATLANTIC (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
entertainment/archive/2018/01/full-transcript-oprah-winfreys-speech-at-the 
-golden-globes/549905. 
 44. See TIME’S UP, https://www.timesupnow.com/#ourmission-anchor (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2018) (advocating for increased representation of women in po-
sitions of power and equal representation, opportunities, benefits, and pay in 
the wake of the MeToo movement). 
  
2018] LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF METOO 235 
 
and Hollywood power players, including Shonda Rhimes and 
Eva Longoria, issued a summary of their proposed response.45 
Anita Hill, who famously testified against Clarence Thomas at 
his Supreme Court confirmation hearing, is chairing a commit-
tee on harassment in media.46 A number of states, including New 
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and California are considering 
legislation banning certain types of non-disclosure agreements.47 
Congress is working on changes to its process for handling har-
assment complaints by congressional employees.48 Legislators 
have also introduced bills restricting the use of arbitration 
agreements in harassment disputes,49 and separately require 
employers to disclose settlements of harassment and discrimina-
tion claims.50 
This Article describes the potential legal and practical im-
plications of the MeToo movement and evaluates them within 
the context of past scholarly commentary.  
First, the Article provides a summary of harassment law 
and the respects in which judicial interpretations of harassment 
law might change in the wake of MeToo. As Sandra Sperino and 
Suja Thomas argued, judges may update their application of the 
“severe or pervasive” standard for harassment to reflect modern 
 
 45. Lorena Blas, Hollywood’s A-list Women Launch Anti-Harassment Initi-
ative Time’s Up, USA TODAY (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
life/people/2018/01/01/hollywood-women-times-up-anti-sexual-harassment 
-project-reese-witherspoon-shonda-rhimes/994268001. 
 46. Cara Buckley, Anita Hill to Lead Hollywood Commission on Sexual 
Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/15/ 
movies/anita-hill-hollywood-commission-sexual-harassment.html. 
 47. S. 820, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017); S. 999, 2017 Leg., 2017 Sess. 
(P.A. 2017); Assemb. B. 5287, 217th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2017); S. 6382, 2017 
Leg., 214th Sess. (N.Y. 2017); Ilyse Schuman & Betsy Cammarata, Lawmakers 
Take Aim: Will #MeToo Curb Nondisclosure or Arbitration Agreements?, LIT-
TLER (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/ 
lawmakers-take-aim-will-metoo-curb-nondisclosure-or-arbitration. 
 48. See Leigh Ann Caldwell, House Unveils Landmark Sexual Harassment 
Overhaul Bill, NBC NEWS (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/ 
congress/house-unveils-landmark-sexual-harassment-overhaul-bill-n838436. 
49. See, e.g., H.R. 4734, 115th Cong. § 402 (2017). For a discussion of the 
proposed arbitration reforms, see Written Testimony of Elizabeth Tippett, Asso-
ciate Professor, University of Oregon School of Law, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 
EMP. COMMISSION (June 11, 2018), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/ 
harassment/6-11-18.cfm. See generally Jean Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration 
Stymies Progress Towards Justice in Employment Law: Where To, #Me-Too?, 53 
HARV. C.R. C.L. (forthcoming 2019).  
 50. H.R. 4729, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017). 
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norms rather than rely on dated lower court rulings.51 Courts 
may also grow more stringent in their application of the Fara-
gher defense, which relates to the reasonableness of the em-
ployer’s efforts to prevent and address discrimination. The Me-
Too movement revealed defects in employers’ internal 
compliance systems, which may make judges and juries more re-
ceptive to arguments that the employer’s efforts were unreason-
able. 
Next, the Article summarizes legal rules relating to the en-
forceability of non-disclosure provisions. It then examines how 
the legislation could affect employer contracting practices. Em-
ployers are likely to include more carve-outs when they demand 
secrecy of employees through confidentiality agreements, social 
media policies, and in settlement agreements. The proposed leg-
islation will also likely limit, or even preclude, related provisions 
in settlement agreements that restrict employee speech, like 
non-disparagement provisions, non-cooperation clauses, and 
provisions relating to affirmative statements. The legislation 
will also limit employers’ ability to promise secrecy to employees 
accused of misconduct. 
The MeToo movement, particularly when combined with 
shifts in judicial interpretations and legal reforms, stands to 
have a lasting effect on employer disciplinary practices. Employ-
ers are likely to continue to take a more punitive approach to 
documented harassment. A more punitive approach will encom-
pass a broader range of meaningful discipline than termination 
alone, and will likely include demotions, promotion denials, pay 
cuts, or other loss of status. Employers are also likely to alter 
executive employment contracts and privacy policies to provide 
themselves with more latitude to discipline employees for docu-
mented harassment, and to disclose those decisions if necessary. 
The Article concludes by recommending revisions to em-
ployer harassment and discrimination policies. Harassment pol-
icies should be more transparent and explain the contextual fac-
tors that influence the company’s assessment of the severity of 
policy violation. Antidiscrimination policies should explain that 
supervisors are entrusted with maintaining the integrity of the 
company’s personnel decisions, which includes refraining from 
conduct or comments that would cast doubt on their ability to 
maintain the company’s commitment to equal opportunity. In 
 
 51. Sandra Sperino & Suja Thomas, Boss Grab Your Breasts? That’s Not 
(Legally) Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/11/29/opinion/harassment-employees-laws-.html. 
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combination, such revisions avoid some of the false dilemmas 
and confusion that have arisen following the MeToo movement. 
These changes are also better aligned with the employer’s true 
litigation risks, and basic notions of fairness and trust. 
I.  SHIFTS IN INTERPRETATIONS OF EXISTING LAW  
This Part provides an overview of harassment law and re-
lated scholarly commentary. It then examines how courts might 
alter their application of existing law in the wake of the MeToo 
movement. In particular, courts may relax their application of 
the “severe or pervasive” requirement and impose more exacting 
standards on employers seeking to establish the Fara-
gher/Ellerth defense. 
A. CURRENT LAW 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act contains no explicit refer-
ence to harassment. However, the Supreme Court recognized 
harassment as a form of discrimination in the 1986 decision, 
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.52 The Meritor decision defined 
harassment as severe or pervasive conduct so offensive as to al-
ter the terms or conditions of the plaintiff ’s employment.53 Mer-
itor was a sexual harassment case, but its ruling applied to har-
assment on the basis of other protected categories under Title 
VII, citing a lower court ruling recognizing harassment on the 
basis of race.54 
The Supreme Court elaborated on and refined Meritor’s def-
inition in subsequent rulings. The 1993 decision, Harris v. Fork-
lift, declared that harassment must be both subjectively and ob-
jectively offensive to qualify as harassment—meaning the 
complainant must have been offended by the conduct, and the 
conduct must be offensive to a reasonable person.55 The 1998 de-
cision, Oncale v. Sundowner, included a number of refinements 
to existing law.56 It held that harassment must be motivated by 
the plaintiff ’s membership in a protected category to qualify as 
harassment.57 The Court also clarified that sexual conduct was 
not required to prove harassment claims, and reinforced the sta-
 
 52. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). 
 53. Id. at 67. 
 54. Id. at 66. 
 55. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993). 
 56. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79–82 (1998). 
 57. Id. at 80. 
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tus of harassment claims as a variant of other types of discrimi-
nation claims.58 Oncale further cautioned courts against enforc-
ing Title VII’s anti-harassment mandate as a “civility code.”59 
Lastly, it urged courts to consider the context in which the con-
duct occurred, noting that a “coach smack[ing] [a football player] 
on the buttocks as he heads onto the field” is different from sim-
ilar conduct in an office.60 
Since Meritor, the Supreme Court has specified the condi-
tions under which employers will be vicariously liable for har-
assment. While employers are strictly liable for discrimination 
and retaliation,61 harassment claims have produced more uncer-
tainty regarding employer liability. Harassment has been histor-
ically viewed as closer to a tort claim, a “frolic or detour” that 
solely benefits the harasser, rather than employer.62 Conse-
quently, courts have been reluctant to hold employers strictly li-
able. At the same time, courts recognize that a supervisor’s har-
assing acts are enabled by the power delegated to him through 
the employer.63 This has led courts to develop a complex series 
of standards governing vicarious liability for harassment. 
Vicarious liability for harassment under Title VII depends 
on whether the putative harasser is a coworker or supervisor.64 
If the harasser is a coworker, the plaintiff must show that the 
employer was negligent in its handling of harassment: that the 
employer knew or should have known about the harassment and 
failed to act.65 If the harasser is a supervisor, the employer is 
strictly liable when the supervisor took some form of tangible 
employment action against the plaintiff, like a demotion, firing, 
or pay cut.66 For example, if an employee rebuffs a supervisor’s 
 
 58. See Steven Wilborn, Taking Discrimination Seriously: Oncale and the 
Fate of Exceptionalism in Sexual Harassment Law, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
677, 678 (1999). 
 59. Id. at 703. 
 60. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. 
 61. Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite Is Free: Employer Liability for Sex-
ual Harassment, 61 PITT. L. REV. 671, 731–32 (2000). 
 62. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 794 (1998). 
 63. Id. at 805. 
 64. Under the 2013 decision, Vance v. Ball State University, 570 U.S. 421, 
424–26 (2013), a supervisor is an employee empowered [by the employer] to take 
tangible employment actions against the victim. Specifically, supervisor status 
requires “the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline an em-
ployee.” In other words, a supervisor must have formal authority over the har-
assment victim, not just the informal power to direct their activities. 
 65. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1997)). 
 66. Id. at 807. 
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overtures and the supervisor responds by punishing the em-
ployee with a demotion, the employer would be strictly liable. 
In the absence of a tangible employment action, the em-
ployer is presumed liable unless the employer can establish an 
affirmative defense under the 1998 Supreme Court rulings, Bur-
lington Industries v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton67 
(Faragher defense). Employers can establish the Faragher de-
fense if (1) the employer took reasonable measures to prevent or 
redress the harassment, and (2) the plaintiff unreasonably fails 
to take advantage of those measures.68 As originally articulated 
by the Supreme Court, a plaintiff’s claim is preserved if they 
make a complaint through an employer’s proffered internal com-
plaint mechanism. However, some subsequent court of appeals 
decisions have held that a reasonable response from the em-
ployer—even when the employee complains—is sufficient to in-
sulate the employer from liability.69 
Commentators have criticized harassment law for produc-
ing uncertainty over what qualifies as harassment.70 David 
Sherwyn, Michael Heise, and Zev Eigen captured this sentiment 
when they observed that “[d]ifficulties with determining what 
type of conduct qualifies as unlawful sexual harassment con-
tinue to vex academicians, legal scholars, and practitioners.”71 
Michael Frank devoted an entire law review article to figuring 
out what the Supreme Court might have meant in Oncale when 
it instructed courts to consider the “social context” in evaluating 
a harassment claim.72 
The flexible nature of the Supreme Court standard for har-
assment has given lower courts considerable latitude. Scholars 
 
 67. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751–56 (1998); see 
also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 786–810. 
 68. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
 69. Id. at 807; Indest v. Freedom Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 267 (5th 
Cir. 1999). 
 70. Michael J. Frank, The Social Context Variable in Hostile Environment 
Litigation, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 437, 442 (2002) (noting the complexity of 
implementing the Supreme Court’s instruction to consider the “social context” 
in evaluating harassment claims); Melissa K. Hughes, Through the Looking 
Glass: Racial Jokes, Social Context, and the Reasonable Person in Hostile Work 
Environment Analysis, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1437, 1439 (2003) (describing the 
standard for harassment as “inherently vague”); David Sherwyn et al.; Don’t 
Train Your Employees and Cancel Your “1–800” Harassment Hotline: An Em-
pirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the Affirmative Defense to 
Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1272 (2001). 
 71. Sherwyn et al., supra note 70, at 1272. 
 72. Frank, supra note 70. 
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have devoted significant attention to these lower court interpre-
tations, criticizing them for framing harassment primarily, or 
solely in terms of sexual conduct.73 One study found that cases 
involving “sexualized conduct directed at individual victims” are 
more successful than those “involving differential but nonsexual 
conduct and conduct demeaning to women in general.”74 Other 
scholars observed similar patterns in harassment based on race, 
religion, and age.75 Indeed, an empirical study by Pat Chew and 
Robert Kelley found that judges tended to discount evidence of 
race-based harassment unless it was “overtly race-linked,” such 
as a noose or a racial epithet.76 
Scholars have also criticized the Faragher defense. Joanna 
Grossman argued that strict liability would produce a stronger 
incentive to prevent harassment claims.77 Grossman observed 
that the Faragher defense essentially insulates employers from 
liability following an initial harassment complaint, such that 
“the first bite is free.”78 Similarly, an empirical study by David 
Sherwyn, Michael Heise, and Zev Eigen found that courts tended 
to apply the Faragher defense in a manner that was generally 
 
 73. Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment 
Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 548, 549 (2001) (discussing how cases that involve 
“sexualized conduct directed at individual victims” are more successful than 
those “involving differential but nonsexual conduct and conduct demeaning to 
women in general”); Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 
2061, 2061 (2003); Vicki Schultz, Understanding Sexual Harassment Law in 
Action: What Has Gone Wrong and What We Can Do About It, 29 T. JEFFERSON 
L. REV. 1, 5 (2006). 
 74. Juliano & Schwab, supra note 73, at 549; Schultz, Understanding Sex-
ual Harassment Law, supra note 73, at 16–17. 
 75. Hughes, supra note 70, at 1439 (noting the difficulty of applying har-
assment standard to race-based context); cf. Judith J. Johnson, License to Har-
ass Women: Requiring Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment to Be “Severe or 
Pervasive” Discriminates Among “Terms and Conditions” of Employment, 62 
MD. L. REV. 85, 119–23 (2003) (arguing that “courts tolerate conduct in sexual 
harassment cases that would not be tolerated in racial harassment cases that 
are analogously offensive”); cf. Robert J. Gregory, You Can Call Me a “Bitch” 
Just Don’t Use the “N-Word”: Some Thoughts on Galloway v. General Motors 
Service Parts Operations and Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Insurance Co., 
46 DEPAUL L. REV. 741, 742 (1997) (arguing that courts resolve ambiguities in 
favor of plaintiffs claiming race-based harassment but not sex harassment). See 
generally Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment 
Law, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 49 (2006) (discussing patterns in harass-
ment related to race).  
 76. Chew & Kelley, supra note 75, at 106. 
 77. Joanna L. Grossman, Supra note 61, at 733; cf. Sherwyn et al., supra 
note 70, at 1267 (recommending that the defense be revised to “focus exclusively 
on the employer’s actions”).  
 78. Grossman, supra note 61, at 671. 
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favorable to employers.79 Courts deemed employees to have “un-
reasonably failed” to make use of the employer’s complaint sys-
tem if they waited longer than a few months to complain.80 Sher-
wyn, Heise, and Eigen also identified a number of rulings in the 
employer’s favor even when an employee made a timely com-
plaint.81 The authors concluded that harassment training had no 
effect on whether employers successfully asserted the defense.82 
B. RELAXING THE SEVERE OR PERVASIVE REQUIREMENT 
MeToo may ultimately influence how courts interpret the 
“severe or pervasive” requirement in harassment law. In a 2003 
law review article, Judith Johnson argued that lower courts mis-
used the “severe or pervasive” requirement to “excuse” “egre-
gious conduct that, in many cases, would be criminal or at least 
would outrage any reasonable person.”83 Sperino and Thomas 
made this case in a 2017 New York Times op-ed, urging lower 
courts to reject excessively stringent interpretations of the “se-
vere or pervasive standard.”84 Drawing on their book, Unequal,85 
which documented larger trends in the ways courts undermine 
discrimination law, Sperino and Thomas recounted numerous 
cases involving highly offensive conduct that the court deemed 
insufficiently severe or pervasive to proceed to trial.86 
Sperino and Thomas hypothesized that overly stringent ju-
dicial application of the “severe or pervasive” standard may have 
resulted from outlier decisions in early harassment jurispru-
dence, written by overwhelmingly older male judges hostile to 
harassment claims.87 These decisions had an outsized influence 
on later jurisprudence: judges disinclined toward a particular 
case had a substantial body of law to support their own crimped 
interpretation. Johnson, by contrast, argued that lower courts 
were misinterpreting Supreme Court jurisprudence in their 
overemphasis on the severe or pervasive standard.88 Johnson ar-
gued that the focus of the inquiry should instead be on whether 
 
 79. Sherwyn et al., supra note 70, at 1272. 
 80. Id. at 1297. 
 81. Id. at 1295. 
 82. Id. at 1300–01. 
 83. Johnson, supra note 75, at 86. 
 84. Sperino & Thomas, supra note 51. 
 85. SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL 30–52 (David Kairys 
ed., 2017). 
 86. Id. at 34–36. 
 87. Id. at 37. 
 88. Johnson, supra note 75, at 86. 
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the environment is “objectively hostile or abusive.”89 She also 
found that lower courts tended to limit the plaintiff’s ability to 
introduce evidence of harassment through unfavorable rulings 
on the continuing violations doctrine.90 
Judges of all stripes may be influenced by MeToo in ways 
that alter their application of the legal rules.91 MeToo gave a mi-
crophone to victims willing to share their experience of harass-
ment. It showcased the lasting impact an act of groping, for ex-
ample, had on their well-being. These stories provided context 
for the severity or pervasiveness of the conduct from the victim’s 
perspective. Over time, judges may update their application of 
legal standards for severe or pervasive and objectively hostile 
behavior accordingly. 
This narrative shift could also support an alternate expla-
nation for why some judges previously defined severe or perva-
sive too narrowly.92 Supreme Court jurisprudence has empha-
sized that harassment law is not a civility code, and that 
harassment should be distinguished from usual workplace inter-
actions.93 Judges may have been overly fearful of treading into 
civility code territory, which led to stringent rulings on the se-
vere or pervasive standards.94 While public debates over MeToo 
 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. at 123–29. 
 91. As Catharine MacKinnon observed in an op-ed, “[s]exual harassment 
law can grow with #MeToo” and that “changing norms . . . will . . . transform 
the law as well.” Catharine A. MacKinnon, #MeToo Has Done What the Law 
Could Not, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/ 
opinion/metoo-law-legal-system.html. 
 92. Additionally, the question of whether judges broadly dismiss cases that 
should have been sent to a jury is an empirical question that has not yet been 
answered. Sperino and Thomas’s book cited a few dozen cases, but did not assess 
whether those questions were the exception rather than the rule. SPERINO & 
THOMAS, supra note 85, at 34–36. The cases might, for example, have repre-
sented extreme examples within a broader distribution of case law. Similarly, 
while Johnson leveled a similar critique against judges for crimped interpreta-
tions of the “continuing violations” doctrine that resulted in failed claims, the 
analysis does not necessarily support the empirical conclusion that those cases 
are representative of all claims. See Johnson, supra note 75, at 123–29. 
 93. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
 94. Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051, 1056–57 (8th Cir. 2016) (“The Su-
preme Court has cautioned courts to be alert for workplace behavior that does 
not rise to the level of actionable harassment.”). Blomker describes numerous 
cases involving offensive behavior that did not meet the legal standard. Id. at 
1057. 
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have included some hand wringing over whether ambiguous con-
duct meets colloquial definitions of harassment,95 a much larger 
proportion of high profile MeToo stories involved outrageous con-
duct that was left unaddressed.96 The cost of leaving harassment 
unaddressed may now be more salient for judges, and perhaps 
make them less likely to rule for defendants on summary judg-
ment. 
The uncertain and flexible nature of the legal standard for 
harassment, which has produced so much scholarly criticism,97 
may also liberate judges to move toward a more lenient standard 
for what qualifies as harassment. Judges may, for example, focus 
more heavily on larger questions of whether the conduct is ob-
jectively hostile or abusive, as Johnson advocated.98 Just as 
courts inclined to rule in the employer’s favor have the freedom 
to rely on cases that take a crimped view of the severe or perva-
sive standard,99 so too do they have the freedom to cite more lib-
eral interpretations in their rulings. 
C. MORE RESTRICTIVE FARAGHER DEFENSE 
In the same way that the MeToo movement shed light on the 
severe or pervasive standard, it also exposed problems with the 
way employers implemented their internal processes.100 Revela-
tions that high-level employees previously kept their jobs despite 
multiple harassment complaints suggested that employers 
failed to meaningfully redress the problem. Weinstein served as 
the case in point, where legal structures like employment agree-
ments, internal complaints procedures, and contracts were used 
to further conceal Weinstein’s misdeeds, rather than fix the 
problem.101 
Both legal scholars and social scientists have devoted con-
siderable attention to evaluating employer practices to prevent 
and address workplace harassment and discrimination. In a 
 
 95. Doreen McAllister, #MeToo Movement Has Gone Too Far, Catharine 
Deneuve Says, NPR: THE TWO-WAY (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.npr.org/ 
sections/thetwo-way/2018/01/10/576986585/-metoo-movement-has-gone-too 
-far-catherine-deneuve-says. 
 96. Post-Weinstein, These Are the Powerful Men Facing Sexual Harassment 
Allegations, GLAMOUR (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.glamour.com/gallery/post 
-weinstein-these-are-the-powerful-men-facing-sexual-harassment-allegations. 
 97. See supra notes 70–72. 
 98. See Johnson, supra note 75, at 86. 
 99. SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 85. 
 100. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 101. See supra notes 36–41. 
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2001 law review article, Susan Sturm hailed internal employer 
processes as the preferred approach for advancing employee 
rights.102 Sturm’s model contrasted what she characterized as 
“first generation discrimination,” involving overt discrimination 
and workplace segregation, with “second generation discrimina-
tion,” involving more subtle and complex patterns of exclusion 
and bias.103 Sturm argued that courts are good at “elaborat[ing] 
general legal norms” but employers are best positioned to effec-
tuate those norms through internal processes, organizational 
change, and flexible implementation.104 From this vantage point, 
the Faragher decision was a welcome development because it 
“encourage[d] the development of workplace processes that iden-
tify the meaning of and possible solutions to the problem of sex-
ual harassment.”105  
By contrast, sociologists Frank Dobbin, Erin Kelly, and Lau-
ren Edelman took a much more skeptical stance towards inter-
nal processes like harassment policies and complaint proce-
dures.106 These scholars observed that employers adopted 
internal mechanisms to address discrimination and harassment 
long before there was a legal justification for doing so.107 Dobbin 
and Kelly argued that the expansion of these processes repre-
sented an effort by human resource managers to expand their 
power and influence in the organization.108 Edelman argued that 
these internal processes represent a form of “symbolic compli-
ance” intended to signal the employer’s “attention to” legal 
norms.109 Symbolic compliance signals to employees, courts, reg-
ulatory agencies, and the public that the employer cares about 
compliance.110 The efficacy of those processes is secondary. 
 
 102. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Struc-
tural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 564 (2001). 
 103. Id. at 466–69. 
 104. Id. at 522–24. 
 105. Id. at 481. 
 106. LAUREN B. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW: COURTS, CORPORATIONS, AND 
SYMBOLIC CIVIL RIGHTS 101 (2016); Frank Dobbin & Erin L. Kelly, How to Stop 
Harassment: Professional Construction of Legal Compliance in Organizations, 
112 AM. J. SOC. 1203, 1203–05 (2007). 
 107. Dobbin & Kelly, supra note 106, at 1203–04. 
 108. Id. 
 109. EDELMAN, supra note 106, at 100–01. 
 110. Id. 
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Even as MeToo revealed employers’ failures, it also revealed 
courts’ failure to hold employers accountable for ineffective pro-
cesses.111 Lauren Edelman and Susan Bisom-Rapp argued that 
courts have been too lenient with respect to what qualifies as 
“reasonable measures” to prevent and redress harassment.112 
Edelman identified a number of cases in which courts credited 
employers for the adoption of “reasonable” processes under the 
Faragher defense, despite evidence that the employer’s process 
was flawed or unfair.113 The Sherwyn, Heise, and Eigen study 
likewise found that “reasonable measures” appeared to be lim-
ited to whether the employer had adopted a credible policy re-
garding harassment.114 
MeToo may also influence how courts and juries evaluate 
evidence in support of the Faragher defense.115 Like the “severe 
or pervasive” standard, MeToo also made salient the possibility, 
and even likelihood, that an employer’s processes might be inad-
equate. Popular attention to these defects will likely embolden 
plaintiffs’ lawyers to obtain discovery on those defects116 and to 
argue forcefully for the relevance of such evidence in discovery 
disputes. 
Challenging the employer’s internal processes may also take 
the form of me too evidence. Me too evidence is a term of art in 
employment disputes, which refers to evidence that other em-
ployees have suffered similar harms at the hands of the same 
supervisor or in the same department. In the 2008 Supreme 
 
 111. Id. at 174–77, 180–81. 
 112. Id. at 173; Susan Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers: 
The Questionable Embrace of Employee Sexual Harassment Training by the Le-
gal Profession, 24 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 125, 145 (2002); see also Susan Bisom-
Rapp, Sex Harassment Training Must Change: The Case for Legal Incentives for 
Transformative Education and Prevention, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 62, 63, 74–
75 (2018). 
 113. EDELMAN, supra note 106, at 173–74, 184–88. 
 114. Sherwyn et al., supra note 70, at 1304. That study was completed in the 
years immediately following the Faragher decision. It may have made sense to 
impose a relatively lenient standard in the early days of the defense, on the 
notion that employers needed time to ramp up their internal processes (though 
of course, they had been largely installed years prior). Now, twenty years later, 
employers have little excuse for problematic internal structures. 
 115. It may also influence how courts and juries evaluate evidence of negli-
gence, which is relevant for cases involving coworker harassment. 
 116. For example, plaintiffs’ lawyers could seek statistics suggesting the em-
ployer’s complaint system was biased, that it responded slowly to harassment 
complaints, or that it failed to discipline employees for harassment. The plain-
tiff might also present testimony from employees claiming to have been mis-
treated in the complaint process. 
  
246 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:229 
 
Court decision Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendel-
sohn,117 the Supreme Court instructed trial courts to make case-
by-case determinations as to the relevance of me too evidence.118 
The years to come may see renewed efforts by plaintiffs to use 
me too evidence to challenge the reasonableness of the em-
ployer’s response to a complaint.119 Me too evidence may reveal, 
for example, that other employees experienced harassment in 
the department over a period of years, which the employer failed 
to remediate.120 
Courts may become more demanding with respect to disci-
plinary actions undertaken by an employer following a docu-
mented incident of harassment. Previously, courts did not con-
sider an employer’s decision to retain a documented harasser to 
be fatal to the employer’s defense.121 Courts tended to focus less 
 
 117. 552 U.S. 379, 381 (2008). 
 118. Prior to that decision, some courts recognized a legal doctrine (known 
as the me too doctrine) categorically barring the use of such evidence. See gen-
erally Emma Pelkey, The “Not Me Too” Evidence Doctrine in Employment Law: 
Courts’ Disparate Treatment of “Me Too” Versus “Not Me Too” Evidence in Em-
ployment Discrimination Cases, 92 OR. L. REV. 545 (2013) (discussing how 
courts analyze and determine the relevance and admissibility of me too evidence 
compared to not me too evidence in employment discrimination cases). 
 119. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 335–36 (6th 
Cir. 2008) (permitting “other act” evidence); Waterson v. Plank Rd. Motel Corp., 
43 F. Supp. 2d 284, 288 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (introducing “me too” evidence). 
 120. See, e.g., Hawkins, 517 F.3d at 337–38 (discussing evidence of harass-
ment involving other women); Hatley v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 308 F.3d 473, 475–
76 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that four additional employees in the same position 
testified about early harassment and the company failed to respond); GERALD 
E. ROSEN ET AL., RUTTER GRP. PRACTICE GUIDE, 5:336, Westlaw (database up-
dated May 2018) (“Employers should consider a possible disadvantage to assert-
ing the Ellerth/Faragher defense: It may open the door for plaintiff to introduce 
evidence of the employer’s prior mishandling of unrelated incidents of sexual 
harassment . . . .”). 
 121. See, e.g., Tutman v. WBBM-TV, Inc./CBS, Inc., 209 F.3d 1044, 1049 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (following racial harassment by supervisor, employer merely gave 
him a written warning, ordered him to participate in an interpersonal skills 
training, and offered to rearrange schedules to avoid contact between supervisor 
and victim; court deemed employer’s response reasonable); Indest v. Freeman 
Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 260–61, 267 (5th Cir. 1999) (employer responded 
to harassment complaint by providing a written and verbal reprimand and 
promising victim she would not need to work at the same trade shows as har-
asser, response deemed adequate to satisfy Faragher defense); Savino v. C.P. 
Hall Co., 199 F.3d 925, 936 (7th Cir. 1999) (crediting employer response that 
“made it much more difficult for Popper to oppress Savino without being ob-
served by others”); cf. McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1120 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (“Remedial measures must include some form of disciplinary action 
which must be ‘proportionate to the seriousness of the offense.’” (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted) (quoting Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 
1991))); Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1193 (9th Cir. 2001). 
  
2018] LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF METOO 247 
 
on discipline, and more on whether the employer disseminated a 
policy and attempted to investigate the complaint.122 While 
courts expected employers to undertake some preventative 
measures, that standard could be satisfied with a stern warning 
or some effort to separate the complainant from the accused, in-
cluding offering the complainant a transfer.123 For example, in a 
Ninth Circuit opinion written by Judge Kozinski (who himself 
resigned in 2017 following multiple accusations of harass-
ment),124 the court noted that an investigation counts as a reme-
dial measure because “[a]n investigation is a warning, not by 
words but by action.”125  
Going forward, employers should not expect that superficial 
disciplinary measures following an investigation will satisfy the 
Faragher defense. First, as I will discuss in greater detail below, 
employers have already begun taking a more punitive approach 
with documented harassers, including publicly terminating high 
level employees and disclosing the reason for the termination. In 
 
 122. The Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Holly D. v. California Institute of Tech-
nology suggests that it views the defense primarily in terms of whether the em-
ployer had a harassment policy that “identified contact personnel” and investi-
gation procedures. 339 F.3d 1158, 1177 (9th Cir. 2003). Arguments about an 
employer’s failure to respond adequately following a harassment complaint 
were relevant only insofar as they suggested the policy was “unreasonably im-
plemented.” Id. This is consistent with Sherwyn, Heise, and Eigen’s findings 
that the strongest predictor of whether an employer satisfied the affirmative 
defense was whether it had a policy that it disseminated to employees with a 
reporting mechanism available. Sherwyn et al., supra note 70, at 1283; see also 
Brenneman v. Famous Dave’s of Am., Inc., 507 F.3d 1139, 1145 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(holding whether the employer exercised reasonable care consists of two compo-
nents, “prevention and correction,” requiring that “the employer must have ex-
ercised reasonable care to prevent sexual harassment . . . [and] promptly cor-
rected any sexual harassment that occurred”). 
 123. See, e.g., Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 644 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[In cases 
involving co-worker harassment,] [w]e have found an employer’s actions to be 
adequate, as a matter of law, where management undertook an investigation of 
the employee’s complaint within a day . . . spoke to the alleged harasser . . . and 
warned the harasser that the company does not tolerate any sexual comments 
or actions.”); Brenneman, 507 F.3d at 1145 (holding employer responded ade-
quately when it offered to transfer complainant to another restaurant); Tutman, 
209 F.3d at 1049 (“[T]he question is not whether the punishment was propor-
tionate to [the supervisor’s] offense but whether [the employer] responded with 
appropriate remedial action reasonably likely under the circumstances to pre-
vent the conduct from recurring.”); Indest, 164 F.3d at 267. 
 124. Niraj Chokshi, Federal Judge Alex Kozinski Retires Abruptly After Sex-
ual Harassment Allegations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2017/12/18/us/alex-kozinski-retires.html. 
 125. Swenson, 271 F.3d at 1193. 
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an environment where termination is a common response to sub-
stantiated acts of harassment, superficial forms of discipline 
start to look less reasonable. The MeToo movement has made 
the costs of ineffective discipline more salient for employers. The 
continued misconduct of a documented harasser becomes fore-
seeable, and makes the employer’s inaction less reasonable.  
Technological changes are likely to accelerate this trend. 
Previously, notions of “reasonableness” were made in the ab-
stract, without data about how employers made decisions. How-
ever, cloud-based ethics and HR management tools are starting 
to close this information gap.126 Cloud-based software used by 
multiple employers enable the software maker to aggregate 
practices and generate statistics about how other employers 
have responded in similar situations.127 This information could 
provide cover for an employer, or undermine the reasonableness 
of a decision.128 If most employers retain an employee after a 
substantiated complaint of harassment by a subordinate, then 
the statistics would protect employers by making their decision 
appear reasonable.129 However, once employers begin to shift 
their behavior towards a more punitive approach, employers 
that depart from the norm appear unreasonable. 
In the MeToo era, plaintiffs’ lawyers may place greater em-
phasis on an employer’s faulty practices in arguments before 
judges and juries. One might readily imagine a jury trial where 
one of the ultimate issues to be decided is whether the employer 
behaved negligently130 or reasonably in response to harass-
ment.131 Because MeToo brought so much attention to the failure 
of employers’ compliance measures, a plaintiff’s lawyer might 
 
 126. See CAROLE SWITZER ET AL., BENCHMARKING (2017), https://www 
.convercent.com/resource/converge17/Converge17-Benchmarking.pdf; NAVEX 
GLOBAL, 2017 ETHICS & COMPLIANCE TRAINING BENCHMARK REPORT, https:// 
www.navexglobal.com/en-us/resources/benchmarking-reports/2017-ethics 
-compliance-training-benchmark-report?RCAssetNumber=2427 (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2018). 
 127. See supra note 126.  
 128. While this information tends to be limited to the employers that use the 
platform, that information could be discoverable if the employer used and con-
sulted the benchmarks in making its own decisions. One might also imagine 
third party companies making aggregate information available publicly on an 
annual basis to inform industry leaders and attract new business. 
 129. Elizabeth C. Tippett, Adapting to the New Risk Landscape, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Feb. 1, 2018, https://hbr.org/2018/02/adapting-to-the-new-risk-landscape.  
 130. A negligence standard applies to coworker harassment. Faragher v. 
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 799 (1998). 
 131. This would be in connection with the employer’s assertion of the Fara-
gher defense, involving supervisor harassment. Id. at 807. 
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play up the holes in the employer’s system. The lawyer might 
present statistics about the number of complaints and the em-
ployer’s disciplinary track record following substantiated com-
plaints. The lawyer might elicit client testimony about mistreat-
ment during the complaint process. Alternatively, the lawyer 
could cross-examine human resources or managers to suggest 
the process was biased against complainants. The lawyer might 
also show clips of the employer’s boring harassment training pro-
gram,132 using it to further demonstrate the employer’s lack of 
commitment to addressing harassment. While evidence of this 
sort was available prior to MeToo, national attention to these 
issues may make the jury more receptive to them. Judges may 
also attach more importance to this evidence and be less inclined 
to grant summary judgment on questions of negligence or rea-
sonableness. 
Part IV, below, will return to the question of how employers 
may alter their disciplinary practices, and related policies, over 
time. But first, Parts II and III examine the legal tools employers 
previously used to maintain the secrecy of harassment and dis-
crimination claims, and how legislative reforms may limit their 
availability. 
II.  STATES ADDRESS NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENTS   
Restrictions on an employee’s ability to publicly disclose 
harassment come in two forms: (1) standard employer policies or 
agreements intended to protect the company’s business secrets 
and overall reputation; and (2) settlement agreements that re-
solve an employment-related dispute or lawsuit. These two types 
of restraints are treated quite differently under existing legal 
rules. 
A. EXISTING LAW 
With respect to the first category, employees arguably have 
the right to publicly disclose harassment or discrimination under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, regardless of contrary language in a policy or contract. 
By contrast, courts are more likely to enforce secrecy provisions 
in a settlement agreement, on the theory that it promotes dis-
pute resolution. 
 
 132. For a content analysis of harassment trainings, see Elizabeth C. Tip-
pett, Harassment Trainings: A Content Analysis, 39 BERKELEY J. LAB & EMP. 
L. (forthcoming 2018). 
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Title VII broadly protects employees from retaliation for “op-
position” to harassment or discrimination in the workplace.133 
While such opposition typically consists of internal complaints 
to the employer, there is some authority for the proposition that 
more public forms of disclosure are protected. In the Supreme 
Court decision Crawford v. Nashville, an employee sought pro-
tection from retaliation after participating in (though not initi-
ating) a company’s internal harassment investigation.134 Ruling 
in the employee’s favor, the Court explained that an employee 
need not go so far as “writing public letters” or “taking to the 
streets” to qualify as protected “opposition” under the statute.135 
This implied that the Court considered these more public forms 
of opposition to be protected as well. Similarly, a Fifth Circuit 
decision from 1981 held that public picketing against an em-
ployer’s discriminatory practices could qualify as protected op-
position.136 A 1983 case from the Ninth Circuit held that writing 
a public letter to the school board complaining about an em-
ployer’s practice was also protected under the opposition 
clause.137  
However, cases involving public opposition also held that it 
must be reasonable, and that “excessive” opposition, or opposi-
tion that “significantly disrupt[s] the workplace” or the plaintiff’s 
productivity,138 is not protected. This means that an employee’s 
decision to reveal harassment or discrimination on social media, 
perhaps through a #metoo post, is subject to some but not unlim-
ited protection.139 If an employer decides to punish a #metoo em-
ployee under its social media policy, that employee may have a 
retaliation claim.140 But the employer may be able to defend the 
 
 133. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012). 
 134. 555 U.S. 271, 275 (2008). 
 135. Id. at 276–77. 
 136. Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1146 
(5th Cir. 1981). 
 137. EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 138. Id. at 1015; Payne, 654 F.2d at 1143; Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for 
Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 231 (1st Cir. 1976). 
 139. See Payne v. WS Servs., LLC, 216 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1319–20 (W.D. 
Okla. 2016) (holding rejected applicant, who complained in Facebook posts and 
wore a homemade sandwich board to protest in public, was not protected due to 
defamatory comments and disparaging comments unrelated to gender discrim-
ination); Caplan v. L Brands/Victoria’s Secret Stores, LLC, 210 F. Supp. 3d 744, 
754–55 (W.D. Pa. 2016) (rejecting plaintiff ’s Section 1981 retaliation claim be-
cause Facebook post containing a picture of a “Ku Klux Klan-reminiscent 
hooded person” did not “objectively complain[ ]  about . . . race discrimination”). 
 140. Emmanuel v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-2894-GHW, 
2015 WL 5036970, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2015) (considering retaliation claim 
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case if it can establish the post was unreasonable or excessively 
disruptive. 
An employee’s social media posts about harassment or dis-
crimination may be independently protected under Section 7 of 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Section 7 protects the 
right of all employees—even if their workplace is not union-
ized141—to engage in “concerted action for mutual aid or protec-
tion.”142 During the Obama administration, the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) took an expansive view of concerted ac-
tivity, asserting that employers violate Section 7 when they pun-
ish employees for social media activity.143 The NLRB also opined 
that overly restrictive social media policies can violate Section 
7.144 
For example, the NLRB held that an employer violated Sec-
tion 7 when it fired employees for Facebook posts discussing how 
to respond to a coworker’s gripes about their job performance.145 
The NLRB reasoned that the coworkers “made common cause” 
in their protest of the coworker’s claims, and “were taking a first 
 
alleging termination a few months after employee complained about pregnancy 
discrimination on Facebook). 
 141. Regina Robson, “Friending” the NLRB: The Connection Between Social 
Media, “Concerted Activities” and Employer Interests, 31 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. 
L.J. 81, 84 (2013) (noting that almost all of social media policies drawing com-
mentary from the NLRB involved non-union workforces). 
 142. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. 774, 813 (2014); D.R. Horton, Inc., 
357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2277 (2012). However, like in the Title VII context, social 
media posts can lose protection where their content would raise other legitimate 
business concerns. For example, in Richmond District Neighborhood Center, the 
Board found that Facebook posts were not protected by Section 7 because they 
advocated insubordination. 361 N.L.R.B. 833, 834–35 (2014); see also Three D, 
LLC, 361 N.L.R.B. 308, 308 (2014) (“[O]nline employee communications can im-
plicate legitimate employer interests, including the ‘right of employers to main-
tain discipline in their establishments.’”); Ariana R. Levinson, Solidarity on So-
cial Media, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 303, 313 (discussing the Board’s approach 
to social media comments); cf. NLRB v. Pier Sixty, LLC, 855 F.3d 115, 123–25 
(2d Cir. 2017) (holding Facebook post was protected despite use of profanity). 
 143. The NLRB and Social Media, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/news 
-outreach/fact-sheets/nlrb-and-social-media (last visited Oct. 22, 2018); see, e.g., 
Three D, 361 N.L.R.B. at 308 (holding that a Facebook discussion about em-
ployer’s failure to properly calculate tax withholding was a protected concerted 
activity). But see Levinson, supra note 142, at 307, 310 (arguing that the NLRB 
decisions were in line with precedent and noting that appellate courts have af-
firmed the Board’s decisions). 
 144. See NLRB, MEMORANDUM GC 15-04, at 20–21 (2015), https://www.nlrb 
.gov/reports-guidance/general-counsel-memos (follow “Memo Number” drop 
down tab; then follow “GC-15xx”; then follow “apply” hyperlink; then follow “GC 
15-04” hyperlink). 
 145. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. 368, 369–70 (2012). 
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step towards taking group action to defend themselves.”146 The 
work-related nature of the discussion on matters that affected 
them jointly brought the activity under the protection of Section 
7.147 
A social media post describing harassment or discrimination 
arguably falls within this expansive frame of protected Section 7 
activity. A MeToo post would clearly qualify as work-related. The 
“metoo” hashtag has frequently been characterized as an expres-
sion of solidarity, and the phrase itself suggests a collective 
cause.148 The post might not only serve to mobilize others within 
a workplace who have experienced similar harassment or dis-
crimination, but it might also mobilize those unaffected but nev-
ertheless outraged by the conduct.149 #MeToo can also be a start-
ing point for workplace mobilization around questions of 
employer practices with respect to promotion, compensation, or 
even safety concerns.150 However, NLRB protection may be fleet-
ing. The Board consists of political appointees, who serve a five-
year term appointed by the President.151 As terms run out on 
Obama appointees to the Board, Trump appointees are likely to 
 
 146. Id. at 369. 
 147. Id. at 370. 
 148. See Levinson, supra note 142, at 320 (“The fact that posts to social me-
dia are intended to be shared by others including coworkers is the underlying 
rationale for finding that ‘liking’ a coworker’s post is concerted activity. It sets 
the groundwork for potential future action by raising awareness about the issue 
and by discussing it . . . .”). 
 149. For example, in one case examined by the NLRB, an employer termi-
nated an employee after she complained about a manager’s sexist remark on 
Facebook, as well as the treatment of other employees. NLRB, MEMORANDUM 
OM 12-31, at 19–20 (2012). The NLRB deemed her actions concerted activity, 
though the reasoning was strongly rooted in her assistance of fellow employees. 
Id.; see Levinson, supra note 142, at 319 (“[E]ven in a circumstance where one 
employee complains to non-coworkers, the employee may be engaging in con-
certed activity. . . . [T]he employee might post to complain to a government offi-
cial, a union representative, or the media.”); Robson, supra note 141, at 94 (ex-
plaining that Board decisions generally “pinned concerted activities, not to the 
subject matter of the action, but on the existence of affirmative indications of 
interest from coworkers or a call for group action” (citing Alleluia Cushion Co., 
221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975))). 
 150. See Robson, supra note 141, at 102 (“Where face-to-face communica-
tions are limited or absent, however, the number of co-worker ‘friends’ respond-
ing to a post, and the content of their messages, appear to affect the determina-
tion of whether the action is concerted.”). 
 151. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2012); William B. Gould IV, Politics and the Effect on 
the National Labor Relations Board’s Adjudicative and Rulemaking Processes, 
64 EMORY L.J. 1501, 1506 (2015). 
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make more conservative rules, and may take a narrower ap-
proach to their interpretation of concerted activity.152 
While Title VII and the NLRA offer some authority for the 
proposition that employees may speak notwithstanding a confi-
dentiality agreement or social media policy, those rules don’t ap-
ply in the case of settlement agreements. Settlement agreements 
are treated quite differently as a matter of law because they 
waive rights otherwise protected under Title VII or the NLRA. 
Courts routinely enforce settlement contracts containing provi-
sions restricting an employee from talking about the dispute or 
making disparaging statements about the employer.153 These 
agreements do not offend public policy, in the courts’ view.154 
Rather, courts assume they are promoting settlement, party 
autonomy, and the possibility of bringing finality to otherwise 
 
 152. See Amy Semet, Political Decision-Making at the National Labor Rela-
tions Board: An Empirical Examination of the Board’s Unfair Labor Practice 
Decisions Through the Clinton and Bush II Years, 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 223, 284 (2016) (empirical study finding that NLRB “appointees . . . act as 
partisans once on the Board, and this partisanship appears to be magnified if 
they . . . sit on a panel with other co-partisans”); Josh Eidelson, Trump’s Labor 
Board Picks Are Scaring Away Unions, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 14, 2018), https:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-14/trump-s-nlrb-scorned-by-grad 
-students. 
 153. Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Con-
fidential Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 869 (2007). 
 154. See Gulliver Schs., Inc. v. Snay, 137 So. 3d 1045, 1046, 1048 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2014) (finding a breach of the confidentiality provision in settlement 
agreement where the claimant disclosed the settlement to his daughter, who 
posted about it on Facebook); Smelkinson Sysco v. Harrell, 875 A.2d 188, 194–
95, 197–99 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (enforcing a stipulated damages provision 
in finding that the violation of a non-disparagement clause constituted a breach 
of a settlement agreement); Mathis v. Controlled Temperature, Inc., No. 
275323, 2008 WL 782634, at *7 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2008) (finding a breach 
of a settlement agreement when an employee disclosed to her future employer 
that she “won” a legal dispute with her former employer, “a ‘little bit’ about how 
she was harassed by the owner, manager, or her boss,” and that she “had some 
problems with her manager treating her badly”); Carlini v. Gray Television 
Grp., Inc., No. A-15-1239, 2017 WL 1653624 at *4 (Neb. Ct. App. May 2, 2017), 
(finding that an employee breached a settlement agreement by violating its non-
disclosure provision); cf. Tujetsch v. Bradley Dental, LLC, No. 09-C-5568, 2010 
WL 5099981, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 2010) (noting that a non-disclosure provi-
sion in a settlement agreement without an exception for lawful court orders and 
subpoenas would be unenforceable). But see, e.g., Robinson v. Harrison Transp. 
Servs., Inc., No. 5:15-CV-298-F, 2016 WL 3647616, at *4 (E.D.N.C. June 30, 
2016) (withholding court approval of a confidentiality provision in a settlement 
of an FLSA case); Goldberg v. Egg Harbor Twp. Sch. Dist., No. 11-1228-
RBK/KMW, 2011 WL 5554501, at *7 (D.N.J. Nov. 14, 2011) (refusing to enforce 
a confidentiality provision in a settlement agreement with public employer be-
cause public records laws required their disclosure).  
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rancorous disputes.155 This line of reasoning accords with a rich 
body of literature regarding the policy merits of a judicial system 
that relies heavily on settlements to function. Carrie Menkel-
Meadow offers a moral defense of settlement, arguing that set-
tlement better incorporate parties’ values and priorities.156 
When parties prefer to settle, the justice system does right by 
effectuating their intent.157 Menkel-Meadow supports confiden-
tiality provisions, arguing that parties’ preferences should pre-
vail and that it is “antidemocratic and ultimately harmful to our 
legal and political system to insist that all disputes be publicly 
aired.”158 Scott Moss evaluates confidential settlements from a 
law and economics standpoint, observing that confidentiality 
provisions broadly facilitate settlements by widening the bar-
gaining range.159 Where employers value confidentiality more 
than individual employees, their willingness to pay a secrecy 
premium facilitates settlement where the parties wouldn’t oth-
erwise agree.160 
An opposing body of literature questions the public policy 
implications of settlement.161 In the employment context, Minna 
 
 155. See EEOC v. Northlake Foods, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1369 (M.D. 
Fla. 2005) (issuing a protective order precluding the EEOC from disclosing the 
amount of settlement in a discrimination case); Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica 
Hous. Servs., 187 F.R.D. 453, 459, 461 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (in refusing to order 
disclosure of a confidential settlement of harassment claim, the court noted that 
“[w]hile protecting the confidentiality of settlement agreements encourages set-
tlement, which is in the public interest, permitting disclosure would discourage 
settlements, contrary to the public interest,” and that “[t]here is a strong public 
interest in encouraging settlements and in promoting the efficient resolution of 
conflicts”). But see Waterson v. Plank Road Motel Corp., 43 F. Supp. 2d 284, 288 
(N.D.N.Y. 1999) (permitting “Me Too” evidence from an employee who had set-
tled a discrimination and harassment claim, despite the non-disclosure provi-
sion in the settlement agreement). 
 156. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical 
and Democratic Defense of Settlement, 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2669, 2673, 2676–80 
(1995). 
 157. Id. at 2692. 
 158. Id. at 2683–84. 
 159. Moss, supra note 153, at 878–79. 
 160. Id. at 879. 
 161. In Against Settlement, Owen M. Fiss argues that settlement under-
mines the function of the judicial system in a number of respects. Owen M. Fiss, 
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984). Settlements deprive parties 
of the fact-finding process of discovery and a judicial decision on the merits. Id. 
at 1085–86. Settlements crimp the development of important precedent. Id. at 
1087–89. Fiss also argues that settlements exacerbate existing power imbal-
ances, where information asymmetries, resource limitations, and risk aversion 
lead less powerful parties to settle at a discount. Id. at 1076–77. Scholars offer 
a number of responses to Fiss’s claims. See, e.g., Amy J. Cohen, Revisiting 
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Kotkin argues that settlements render discrimination and har-
assment invisible, because settled claims do not appear on the 
docket.162 Kotkin claims that confidentiality provisions are not 
really a matter of choice for discrimination plaintiffs because 
“[c]orporate defendants insist on such clauses.”163 Ultimately, 
she argues such settlements are problematic because they im-
pair “the right of the public to know.”164 
B. PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
Since the MeToo movement, several states, including Penn-
sylvania, New York, and California, are considering or have 
passed prohibitions on certain types of non-disclosure agree-
ments.165 California is considering multiple bills.166 New York 
has already passed one law relating to non-disclosure and is con-
sidering a second bill.167 
The proposed bills vary in three important respects. First, 
they vary in the types of disclosures that cannot be restricted 
through contract. Second, they vary as to whether they limit all 
agreements, or only agreements signed under certain conditions. 
And third, some contain an exception for non-disclosure provi-
sions requested by the victim. 
 
 
 
 
 
Against Settlement: Some Reflections on Dispute Resolution and Public Values, 
78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1143, 1163–68 (2009) (summarizing ADR literature re-
sponding to Fiss’s claim). First, as David Luban observes, it is neither feasible 
nor desirable for courts to adjudicate every case, and an overload of precedent 
would likely produce substantial inconsistency in legal rules. David Luban, Set-
tlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2643–44 (1995). 
Second, the civil justice system tends to do a poor job of addressing power im-
balances. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 156, at 2688; cf. Robert H. Mnookin & 
Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 
88 YALE L.J. 950, 966–68 (1979). 
 162. Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 
N.C. L. REV. 927, 929 (2006). 
 163. Id. at 929. 
 164. Id. at 947. 
 165. S. 820, 2017–18 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); S. 1300, 2017–18 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2018); Assemb. B. 3080, 2017–18 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); S. 6382-A, 240th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017); S. 999, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2017). New 
Jersey considered a bill but it did not pass. S. 5287, 217th Leg., Assemb. (N.J. 
2017). 
 166. Cal. S. 820; Cal. S. 1300; Cal. Assemb. B. 3080. 
 167. S. 7507-C, 241st Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018); N.Y. S. 6382-A. 
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Table 1 – Proposed Non-Disclosure Legislation 
Bill Provisions covered Types of 
agree-
ments 
Exception for 
victim re-
quests 
Cal. S. 
820 
Provisions that  
prevent the disclosure 
of factual information 
relating to sex-based 
harassment and sex 
discrimination claims. 
Post-filing 
settlement 
agreements 
Yes. Settlement 
amount can also 
remain confi-
dential. 
Cal.  
Assemb. 
B. 3080 
Prohibitions on  
disclosing harassment, 
or opposing any un-
lawful practice. 
Essentially 
any  
contracts 
with con-
tractors or 
employees 
No. 
Cal. S. 
1300 
Non-disparagement 
provisions that pre-
vent employees from 
disclosing unlawful 
conduct, including 
harassment. 
Condition 
of employ-
ment 
No. 
N.Y. S. 
7507-C 
(KK)(D) 
Provisions that  
prevent the disclosure 
of the underlying facts 
and circumstances of a 
sexual harassment 
claim. 
Settlement 
agreements 
Yes, for mutual 
non-disclosure, 
with 21 days to 
consider, and 7-
day revocation 
period. 
N.Y. S. 
6382-A 
Provisions with the 
purpose or effect of 
concealing information 
relating to a claim of 
discrimination, non-
payment of wages,  
retaliation, harass-
ment or violation of 
public policy. 
All  
contracts 
No. 
Pa. S. 
999 
Provisions that impair 
or attempt to impair 
the ability of a person 
to report a claim of 
sexual misconduct. 
All  
contracts 
No, but the  
victim’s name 
and amount of 
settlement can 
be confidential. 
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The two narrowest bills are the proposed California Senate 
Bill 820, and New York Senate Bill 7507-C, which was passed as 
part of the state budget.168 Both are limited to settlement agree-
ments, and, in the case of California Senate Bill 820, only post-
filing settlement agreements.169 Both are also somewhat limited 
in terms of the claims covered—New York’s is limited to sexual 
harassment, while California’s is limited to sex-based discrimi-
nation and harassment claims.170 Both also include an exception 
if the victim requests a secrecy provision.171 Pennsylvania’s pro-
posed bill is somewhat circumscribed.172 It is limited to claims 
involving sexual misconduct, but covers all contracts and does 
not provide for a procedural exception that would allow the vic-
tim to request confidentiality.173 
Both New York and California are also considering broader 
statutes.174 California’s Assembly Bill 3080 would prohibit em-
ployers from imposing contracts that prevent employees from 
disclosing “an instance of sexual harassment” or “opposing any 
unlawful practice.”175 California’s Senate Bill 1300 would limit 
non-disparagement agreements entered into as a condition of 
employment.176 Similarly, New York’s proposed Senate Bill 
6382-A would render unenforceable any contract “which has the 
purpose or effect of concealing the details relating to a claim of 
discrimination, non-payment of wages or benefits, retaliation, 
harassment, or violation of public policy in employment.”177 The 
last of these, “violation of public policy in employment,”178 refers 
to a common law whistleblower claim that protects employees 
from retaliation for disclosures that advance a public policy in-
terest articulated by the state courts or legislatures.179 This co-
 
 168. Cal. S. 820 § 1(a); N.Y. S. 7507-C (KK)(D). 
 169. Cal. S. 820 § 1(a); N.Y. S. 7507-C (KK)(D). 
 170. Cal. S. 820 § 1(a); N.Y. S. 7507-C (KK)(D). 
 171. Cal. S. 820 § 1(b). 
 172. S. 999, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2017).  
 173. Id. 
 174. Assemb. B. 3080, 2017–18 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); S. 6382-A, 240th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018). 
 175. Cal. Assemb. B. 3080 § 3. This bill would not be limited to contracts 
imposed “as a condition of employment” but also provisions “as a condition of 
entering into a contractual agreement.” This would seemingly cover any agree-
ment where the disclosure is not optional for the employee. Id. 
 176. S. 1300, 2017–18 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
 177. N.Y. S. 6382-A § 2. 
 178. Id. 
 179. RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW §§ 5.01–5.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2015). 
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vers a broad range of whistleblowing, including matters of con-
sumer harm,180 health and safety,181 criminal conduct,182 and 
even environmental harms.183 The New York law effectively co-
vers any disclosure an employee might make about unlawful 
conduct, employment-related or otherwise. 
In sum, while Title VII and Section 7 of the NLRA may pro-
tect employees who speak out against harassment, those rights 
can be waived through settlement agreements. A number of 
states have sought to alter this state of affairs by rendering cer-
tain secrecy-related provisions unenforceable. Part III examines 
how employers are likely to change their practices in response to 
such legislation. 
III.  PRACTICES COMPELLED BY LEGISLATIVE 
CHANGES   
The MeToo movement is broadly moving employment prac-
tices to a form of forced transparency. Employees who have ex-
perienced harassment or discrimination are more likely to speak 
publicly, forcing employers to respond. In addition, proposed 
state legislation seeks to limits employers’ ability to use con-
tracts to restrain employees from speaking publicly. 
If states pass legislation restricting secrecy for harassment 
or other employment claims, it will limit, though not eliminate, 
provisions in employer contracts and policies that restrict em-
ployee speech. As explained in greater detail below, employers 
can continue to use some of their existing contract and policy 
provisions, provided they contain a carve-out for certain types of 
disclosures. Other types of provisions will need to be narrowed 
or removed entirely, especially provisions that promise secrecy 
to an employee accused of misconduct. 
In this Section, the Article examines how proposed legisla-
tion will limit employers’ ability to demand—and promise—con-
fidentiality through their contracts and policies. 
 
 180. Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1333 (Cal. 1980). 
 181. Hobson v. McLean Hosp. Corp., 522 N.E.2d 975, 977 (Mass. 1988); 
O’Sullivan v. Mallon, 390 A.2d 149, 150 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978). 
 182. Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 877 (Ill. 1981). 
 183. Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 570 (Minn. 
1987). 
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A. CARVE-OUTS IN CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENTS AND SOCIAL 
MEDIA POLICIES. 
While public debates about secrecy provisions have gener-
ally centered on settlement agreements containing non-disclo-
sure provisions, secrecy provisions also appear in standard em-
ployee forms and policies, including confidentiality agreements 
and social media policies. 
Employees typically sign some form of confidentiality agree-
ment at the start of their employment.184 These agreements re-
strict an employee’s ability to disclose the company’s confidential 
information. The term “confidential information” is typically de-
fined as “information related to the company’s business,” fol-
lowed by a non-exhaustive list of examples of business infor-
mation, such as business plans, technical information, and 
source code.185 Depending on how the contract is worded,186 such 
provisions may not even cover disclosures relating to an em-
ployee’s experience of harassment or discrimination in the work-
place. As a matter of contract interpretation, such experiences 
may fall outside the definition of confidential information and 
the employee would be free as a contractual matter to disclose 
such information.187 
Employers also use policies to restrict employee speech. The 
growth of social media has led employers to be especially con-
cerned that employees will use it to disparage the company’s 
products or work environment in ways that will impair their 
brand.188 Consequently, employers commonly adopt policies that 
limit how current employees can use social media, even away 
 
 184. See, e.g., Joshua Mates, Tips for Onboarding Employees to Early-Stage 
Companies, COOLEYGO, https://www.cooleygo.com/tips-onboarding-employees 
-early-stage-companies (last visited Oct. 22, 2018) (“It is essential that every 
employee (including founders and other executives) sign a confidential infor-
mation and inventions assignment agreement.”). 
 185. M. SCOTT MCDONALD & JACQUELINE C. JOHNSON, UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW: CON-
TRACT SOLUTIONS AND LITIGATION GUIDE 180 (2014). 
 186. Id. at 180–81 (describing variants in contract language). 
 187. But see Coady v. Harpo, Inc., 719 N.E.2d 244, 247 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) 
(enforcing a confidentiality agreement that prohibited an employee from dis-
closing any information “related to or concerning: (a) Ms. [Oprah] Winfrey 
and/or her business or private life . . . and/or (c) Harpo’s employment practices 
or policies”). 
 188. See, e.g., Elizabeth Allen, Note, You Can’t Say That on Facebook: The 
NLRA’s Opprobriousness Standard and Social Media, 45 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
195, 209 (2014). 
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from work.189 These policies vary but generally require that em-
ployees disclaim that they are not speaking on the company’s be-
half.190 They also remind employees not to disclose the com-
pany’s confidential information.191 An aggressive social media 
policy will attempt to prohibit employees from saying anything 
disparaging about the company or its product.192 
 
 189. WILLIAM H. FRANKEL ET AL., CORPORATE COMPLIANCE SERIES: DESIGN-
ING AN EFFECTIVE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMPLIANCE PROGRAM § 4:68 
(2017–18 ed. 2017); Daniel Oberdorfer et al., Policy on Blogging, Social Net-
working, Tweeting, and Other Public Discourse on the Internet, WEST’S LEGAL 
FORMS, EMPLOYMENT § 5.92 (2018). 
 190. See, e.g., Three D, LLC, 361 N.L.R.B. 308, 316 (2014) (describing a so-
cial media policy that required employees to “include a disclaimer that the views 
you share are yours, and not necessarily the views of the Company”); ADIDAS 
GRP., ADIDAS GROUP SOCIAL MEDIA GUIDELINES 1 (2016), https://www.game-
plan-a.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/adidas-Group-Social-Media-Guidelines 
.pdf (requiring employees “make clear that [they] are speaking for [themselves] 
and not for the Group”); FRANKEL ET AL., supra note 189 (“Express only your 
personal opinions . . . Clearly state that your views do not represent the views 
of the [name of employer], other employees, members, customers, or suppliers.”); 
Oberdorfer, supra note 189 (“You must explicitly and conspicuously state that 
the views you are articulating are your own and not the views of the Company. 
You must not state or imply you are speaking for the Company.”); Best Buy So-
cial Media Policy, BEST BUY (July 21, 2016), http://forums.bestbuy.com/t5/ 
Welcome-News/Best-Buy-Social-Media-Policy/td-p/20492 (“[Y]ou must state 
that the views expressed are your own.”); Ford Motor Company’s Digital Partic-
ipation Guidelines, FORD MOTOR CO., (Aug., 2010), https://www.scribd.com/doc/ 
36127480/Ford-Social-Media-Guidelines, (“Make it clear that the views ex-
pressed are yours.”). 
 191. See, e.g., FRANKEL ET AL., supra note 189, § 4:67 (“I will not disclose, 
publish or use, directly or indirectly, any information of the [name of employer] 
or of any person or firm working in conjunction with [name of employer], unless 
I receive express authorization from the [name of employer].”); supra Best Buy 
Social Media Policy, supra note 190; IBM Social Computing Guidelines, IBM, 
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/zz/en/guidelines.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2018). 
 192. See, e.g., NLRB, OM 11-74, REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL 
CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (2011) (noting that a company violated Sec-
tion 7 when employer’s handbook prohibited “making disparaging remarks 
when discussing the company or supervisors, and from depicting the company 
in any media, including but not limited to the internet,” and also prohibited 
“posting pictures of themselves in any media, including the internet, which de-
pict the company in any way”); FRANKEL ET AL., supra note 189 § 4.68 (“Avoid 
using statements, photographs, video, or audio . . . that disparage customers, 
members, employees of [name of employer], suppliers . . . .”). But cf. Christopher 
P. Calsyn & Moring, LLP, Employer Social Media Policies: The “Do’s and 
Don’ts,” LEXISNEXIS (May 4, 2013), https://www.lexisnexis.com/communities/ 
corporatecounselnewsletter/b/newsletter/archive/2013/05/04/employer-social 
-media-policies-the-dos-and-don-ts.aspx (advising companies not to “include 
blanket prohibitions on defaming or otherwise damaging the reputation of 
coworkers, clients or the company”); David Greenhaus, IT Resources and Com-
munications Systems Policy, WESTLAW: PRACTICAL LAW (Aug. 28, 2018) (“Re-
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Whether employers make changes to these form policies and 
agreements will depend in part on the breadth of the legislation 
ultimately passed. Where the law only limits settlement agree-
ments, employers need not make changes to their standard con-
fidentiality agreements and social media policies.193 
If states pass broader legislation, employers are likely to in-
clude carve-outs to their confidentiality agreements and social 
media policies. The carve-outs might explain, for example, that 
the term “confidential information” does not include information 
regarding harassment, discrimination, or other unlawful con-
duct. Of course, an argument could be made that such carve-outs 
are not strictly necessary. Depending on the wording of the con-
tract, the term “confidential information” could be interpreted to 
exclude disclosures of unlawful conduct. Absent state legislation, 
federal protections essentially create an implied exception to 
confidentiality agreements and social media policies. Neverthe-
less, because intellectual property can be so critical to a com-
pany’s business, it will not want to risk the enforceability of its 
confidentiality provision, or the agreement as a whole. Carve-
outs will likely be viewed as a prudent measure to ensure the 
integrity of confidentiality agreements. 
Social media policies are likely to include similar carve-outs 
for provisions in the policy that limit an employee’s speech. How-
ever, employers might not want employees to know that they are 
entirely free to speak out on matters that could be extremely em-
barrassing to the company or damage their brand. Conse-
quently, employers have an incentive to obscure the nature of 
the carve-out by using technical language. For example, some 
employers responded to NLRB decisions regarding concerted ac-
tivity with vague carve-outs, even as NLRB opinions cautioned 
that such language would not pass legal muster.194 Some em-
ployers included exceptions in their social media policy for 
 
member that you are also bound by [EMPLOYER NAME]’s policy against [def-
amation and/or disparagement].”). As discussed in greater detail below, these 
broad policies may already violate Section 7 of the National Labor Relations 
Act. 
 193. Sometimes settlement agreements incorporate these earlier policies by 
reference. In those situations, the settlement agreement should contain a carve-
out for the types of speech restrictions enumerated in the applicable statute. 
 194. See also Three D, LLC, 361 N.L.R.B. 308, 314 (Aug 22, 2014) (scrutiniz-
ing social media policies and finding a Section 7 violation where “employees 
would reasonably interpret it to encompass protected activities”); Martin Luther 
Mem’l Home, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 647 (Nov. 19, 2004) (finding that policies 
violate Section 7 when “employees would reasonably construe the language to 
prohibit Section 7 activity”); Levinson, supra note 142, at 314, 335 (noting some 
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“rights under Section 7 of the NLRA,” without explaining what 
those rights include,195 or noted that the policy did not apply 
where prohibited by law.196 In the context of harassment and dis-
crimination, employers have an incentive to use coded language 
in their carve-outs, such as exceptions for disclosures “protected 
by law,” which does not reveal the scope of the carve-out. 
B. NARROWER LANGUAGE IN SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS WITH 
COMPLAINANTS 
Settlement agreements with harassment victims will like-
wise be affected by the proposed legislation, although the precise 
effect will depend on the structure of the law. Most of the pro-
posed legislation renders certain restraints unenforceable, 
whether in connection with litigation or not.197 By contrast, Cal-
ifornia’s proposed Senate Bill 820 is an amendment to the Code 
of Civil Procedure, and its scope is limited to “civil actions” where 
the pleadings allege sexual assault, sex-based harassment, or 
sex-based discrimination.198 Because the statute is limited to 
post-filing settlements, secrecy-related provisions would still be 
permitted in settlement agreements signed before a case is filed. 
Settlement agreements (often labeled “separation agree-
ments” or “separation and release agreements”) can contain sev-
eral different types of provisions that might limit an employee’s 
ability to speak out: 
 
uncertainty over the type of carve-out that would be satisfactory to the NLRB); 
Robson, supra note 141, at 87, 97 (noting Section 7 violations where employers 
discipline pursuant to an overbroad social media policy). 
 195. See, e.g., FRANKEL ET AL., supra note 189, § 4:67 (providing a form social 
media policy containing a carve-out: “This provision does not apply to employ-
ees’ right to discuss terms and conditions of employment and engage in con-
certed activities under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act . . . .”); 
Oberdorfer, supra note 189 (“Nothing in this policy is intended or will be con-
strued to restrict any of your rights under the National Labor Relations 
Act . . . or your rights to discuss the terms and conditions of your employment.”). 
But see Company Social Media Use Guidelines, WESTLAW: PRACTICAL LAW 
(2018) (containing a much more specific carve-out for concerted activity, refer-
encing “discussing wages, benefits, or terms and conditions of employment, 
forming, joining or supporting labor unions, bargaining collectively through rep-
resentatives of their choosing, raising complaints about working conditions for 
their and their fellow employees’ mutual aid or protection, or legally required 
activities”). 
 196. See Levinson, supra note 142, at 334–35. 
 197. S. 1300, 2017–18 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); Assemb. B. 3080, 2017–18 Reg. 
Sess. (Cal. 2018); S. 6382-A, 240th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018); S. 7507-C, 241st 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (KK)(D) (N.Y. 2018); S. 999, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 
2017).  
 198. S. 820, 2017–18 Reg. Sess. § 1(a) (Cal. 2018). 
  
2018] LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF METOO 263 
 
Non-disclosure provision. Non-disclosure provisions can 
prohibit the employee from revealing the amount of the settle-
ment, discussions leading up to the settlement, the fact of the 
settlement agreement, or even the facts giving rise to the dis-
pute.199 
Non-disparagement provision. Non-disparagement pro-
visions, in their narrow form, only prohibit the employee from 
engaging in defamation, slander, or libel.200 Broader non-dispar-
agement provisions prohibit the employee from making state-
ments that are harmful to the reputation of the other party to 
the agreement.201 
 
 199. See Voluntary Employment Separation Agreement and Release, Exhibit 
10(u), U.S. SEC. & EXCHCHANGE COMMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/74303/000119312504036954/dex10u.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2018); 
see also Gulliver Schs., Inc. v. Snay, 137 So. 3d 1045, 1046 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2014) (referencing the confidentiality provision of a settlement agreement 
providing that the “plaintiff shall not either directly or indirectly, disclose, dis-
cuss or communicate to any entity or person, except his attorneys or other pro-
fessional advisors or spouse any information whatsoever regarding the existence 
or terms of this Agreement”); Wesson v. FMR, LLC, 34 Mass. L. Rptr. 539, 541 
n.4 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2017) (“The Employee will keep the existence, terms, and 
amount of this Agreement in strictest confidence and not disclose any infor-
mation concerning this Agreement to anyone other than her lawyer, her spouse, 
immediate family members, financial adviser, accountants or as required by 
law.”); Mathis v. Controlled Temperature, Inc., No. 275323, 2008 WL 782634, 
at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting a settlement agreement providing that “the 
fact of and terms of this Agreement are strictly confidential and shall not ver-
bally or through disclosure in writing of any kind be communicated . . . to any 
person or entity by any means”); Carlini v. Gray Television Grp., Inc., No. A-15-
1239, 2017 WL 1653624, at *1 (Neb. Ct. App. May 2, 2017) (quoting settlement 
agreement providing that the “existence of this Agreement, the substance of this 
Agreement, and the terms of this Agreement shall be kept absolutely and for-
ever confidential”). 
 200. Separation Agreement and Mutual Release, Exhibit 10.27, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Dec. 28, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/1096560/000129707705000001/ex10_27.htm. 
 201. Mutual Release and Non-Disparagement Agreement, Exhibit 10.3, U.S. 
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Jan. 28, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/866054/000086605404000014/release.htm; see also Smelkinson 
Sysco v. Harrell, 875 A.2d 188, 191 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (citing a non-
disparagement provision stating that “Mr. Harrell agrees not to disparage the 
Company and the Company agrees not to disparage Mr. Harrell”); Wesson, 34 
Mass. L. Rptr. at 541 n.3 (noting a non-disparagement provision where an em-
ployer promised to deliver signed statements from enumerated managers agree-
ing “to not make any statements, take any actions, or conduct themselves in any 
way that adversely affects Employee’s . . . personal or professional reputation 
or endeavors”); Mathis, 2008 WL 782634, at *6 (discussing an agreement provid-
ing that “she shall not verbally or in writing by any means to any other per-
son . . . disparage, criticize, condemn, or impugn the reputation or character of 
CTI, its shareholders, affiliates, agents, officers, directors and/or employees”); 
Carlini, 2017 WL 1653624, at *1 (referencing a settlement agreement providing 
  
264 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:229 
 
Non-cooperation clause. Non-cooperation clauses pro-
hibit parties from cooperating with others in litigation against 
the company, although they typically include a carve-out for sub-
poenas or court orders.202  
Affirmative statements. In its more mundane form, a set-
tlement agreement might contain a promise to provide a neutral 
recommendation.203 However, the Harvey Weinstein scandal re-
vealed some instances where settlement agreements required 
victims to make affirmative statements. In one case, Weinstein 
required one of his victims to sign an attached statement about 
her work experience, which could be used to undermine her cred-
ibility should she later take a contrary public position.204 In an-
other contract, Weinstein apparently required a signatory to say 
“positive things” if she were ever contacted by the media.205 
The proposed legislation will tend to affect the enforceability 
of all four types of provisions. These statutes reach provisions 
that prevent the disclosure of information about certain claims, 
and all the above-listed provisions could have that effect.206 For 
example, when a victim discloses workplace harassment, it will 
have a detrimental effect on the employer’s reputation, and 
thereby breach a broad non-disparagement provision. Enforce-
 
that the “Employee will not make any disparaging public remarks about the 
Company or any of its officers, directors, agents, or employees”). 
 202. See Stephen Gillers, Speak No Evil: Settlement Agreements Conditioned 
on Noncooperation Are Illegal and Unethical, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 21 (2002); 
see also Smelkinson, 875 A.2d at 191 (enforcing provision that plaintiff would 
“neither voluntarily aid nor voluntarily assist in any way third party claims 
made or pursued against the Company”). 
 203. See, e.g., Wesson, 34 Mass. L. Rptr. at 541 n.3 (noting that in its settle-
ment, an employer agreed to sign a reference document attached to the agree-
ment); Mathis, 2008 WL 782634, at *11 (discussing a settlement agreement 
providing that “upon request, it shall provide a neutral reference for Mathis’ 
[sic] future employment, confirming the dates and positions of her employment 
with CTI only”). 
 204. Terry Gross, ‘Times’ Reporters Describe How a Paper Trail Helped 
Break the Weinstein Story, NPR (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/11/ 
15/564310240/times-reporters-describe-how-a-paper-trail-helped-break-the 
-weinstein-story. 
 205. Id. 
 206. S. 820, 2017–18 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (“prevents the disclosure of fac-
tual information”); Assemb. B. 3080, 2017–18 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (“prohibit-
ing . . . from disclosing”); S. 6382-A, 240th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017) (“purpose 
or effect of concealing”); S. 999, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2017) (“sup-
presses or attempts to suppress”); cf S. 1300, 2017–18 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) 
(limited to non-disparagement agreements). 
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ment of that non-disparagement provision would prevent an em-
ployee from disclosing the facts of her case, and would therefore 
be unenforceable as written. 
The legislation may even affect the enforceability of narrow 
non-disparagement provisions, which prohibit only statements 
that qualify as defamation, libel, or slander. As a technical mat-
ter, these provisions do not restrict a victim from making truth-
ful statements about the company or its employees. An employee 
who speaks out is subject to liability for defamation, libel, and 
slander regardless of whether the employee agrees to refrain 
from doing so in a contract. However, it is not difficult to imagine 
how such a provision would make an employee fearful of speak-
ing and in that respect, prevent or suppress an employee’s dis-
closure of facts relating to her case. Consequently, it is possible 
such provisions would likewise be declared unenforceable as 
written. 
Likewise, a non-cooperation agreement could prevent a vic-
tim from disclosing harassment to another employee considering 
suing the employer, which also has the effect of concealing the 
facts. Compelled statements could also have the effect of conceal-
ment, where the victim worries it will be used to impeach her 
credibility, or where a forced positive statement falsely suggests 
the absence of misconduct. 
Speech-restricting provisions may be salvageable in some 
states through carve-outs or clarifying language. For example, a 
non-disparagement provision might be salvageable with a carve-
out stating that nothing in the agreement should be interpreted 
to limit an employee’s ability to disclose harassment, or other 
protected claims enumerated in the statute. 
By contrast, non-cooperation clauses and affirmative state-
ment clauses rest on somewhat shakier ground. Even before the 
MeToo movement, commentators have questioned the legality of 
such clauses. Although non-cooperation clauses typically contain 
an exception for subpoenas, critics note that such exceptions nev-
ertheless hamper the civil justice system by making past liti-
gants unavailable as voluntary witnesses. Jon Bauer argues that 
attorneys should not permit clients to sign such clauses because 
they violate attorney ethics rules, which prohibit attorneys from 
actions “prejudicial to the administration of justice.”207 Stephen 
 
 207. Jon Bauer, Buying Witness Silence: Evidence-Suppressing Settlements 
and Lawyers’ Ethics, 87 OR. L. REV. 481, 481 (2008). But see Smelkinson, 875 
A.2d at 191 (enforcing non-cooperation provision). 
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Gillers went further, arguing that lawyers commit obstruction of 
justice when they request non-cooperation clauses.208 
While an employer’s promise to provide the victim with a 
truthful recommendation letter would not necessarily run afoul 
of the statutory restrictions, provisions requiring victims to 
make affirmative statements would be problematic. Requiring 
an employee to make an affirmative statement implies that it is 
contrary to what the victim would otherwise say, and therefore 
may be inaccurate or misleading.209 Such provisions would con-
sequently be suspect under the proposed legislation, with the ex-
ception of pre-filing agreements under California’s Senate Bill 
820.210 
In summary, while employers will still be able to demand 
some speech restrictions through settlement agreements, those 
restrictions will be substantially limited. 
The legislation may also have some unintended effects, as it 
relates to the victim’s ability to request secrecy of the employer. 
For broader legislation without an express exception for victim 
requests, non-disclosure provisions may need to include a carve 
out allowing the employer to disclose facts relating to the case. 
Similarly, broad non-disparagement provisions in the victim’s 
favor may need to include a carve out allowing the employer to 
disclose truthful facts. By contrast, narrow non-disparagement 
provisions might be enforceable to protect the victim, since they 
wouldn’t operate to conceal the misconduct. 
The possibility that this legislation might restrict a victim’s 
ability to request secrecy from the employer implicates larger 
policy debates raised in the literature.211 Prominent plaintiff’s 
 
 208. Gillers, supra note 202, at 21–22. 
 209. These provisions are, however, exceptionally rare. 
 210. It might also be permissible if requested by the victim under California 
S. 820 and New York S. 7507C, but such statements would likely need to be 
mutual for them to be credibly interpreted as requested by the victim. See S. 
820, 1999 Leg. (Cal. 1999); S. 7505-C, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018). 
 211. In addition, Scott Moss’s analytical framework would predict that the 
New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey approach may have distributive im-
plications for plaintiffs and make such cases more difficult to settle overall. See 
Moss, supra note 153, at 880. In a regime where employers value secrecy more 
than employees, employees are able to extract a higher settlement than they 
otherwise would as a result of settlement. Id. at 879–80. Removing that option 
may mean lower settlements for plaintiffs, or in some cases no settlement. Id. 
at 889. Nevertheless, lower settlement rates may be preferred as a matter of 
public policy. The premium plaintiffs have received in the past for confidential 
settlements could be characterized as a “negative externality” in economic 
terms, because the promise of confidentiality comes at the expense of future 
victims who could have benefited from the information. MeToo is a case in point, 
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lawyer Gloria Allred argued that some plaintiffs prefer secrecy 
and their preferences should be honored.212 As Carrie Menkel-
Meadow argued, parties should be able choose, since the dispute 
belongs to them.213 However, as Minna Kotkin argues, the choice 
is illusory; if employers are allowed to ask for these provisions, 
they will.214 Indeed, the California statute would appear to allow 
the victim to “request” a mutual non-disclosure provision, which 
could potentially be susceptible to employer manipulation. 
The legislation may also have an unintended effect with re-
spect to parties’ bargaining strategy. Scott Moss’s law and eco-
nomics analysis is instructive. As he observed, a California rule 
that restricts secret settlements post-filing, but permits them on 
a pre-filing basis, would push employers towards early settle-
ment, which would save litigation costs overall.215 While such an 
approach would generally promote settlement, it also under-
mines the transparency-related goals that motivated the legisla-
tion in the first place. This approach is also likely to create an 
adverse selection problem, where employers have an incentive to 
settle the most egregious cases before they are revealed in liti-
gation.216 If California legislators intended to expose the worst 
abuses of settlement agreements, Senate Bill 820 is unlikely to 
achieve that result. After all, cases that have been filed with a 
court are already part of the public record, providing some notice 
to current and future employees about sexual harassment or dis-
crimination. By contrast, Harvey Weinstein was able to conceal 
his conduct by settling cases as quickly as possible on a pre-filing 
 
as the high-profile harassers identified in 2017 were revealed to have harassed 
multiple victims. Corey, supra note 13. In this view, prohibitions on pre- or post-
filing provisions correct the negative externality, and essentially force employ-
ers to address the risk that the accused employee may engage in similar mis-
conduct in the future. 
 212. James Rufus Koren, Weinstein Scandal Puts Nondisclosure Agreements 
in the Spotlight, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/la 
-fi-weinstein-nondisclosure-agreements-20171023-story.html. 
 213. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 156, at 2694. 
 214. See Kotkin, supra note 162, at 929–30. 
 215. Moss, supra note 153, at 886, 889. 
 216. See Zev Eigen & David Sherwyn, Deferring for Justice: How Adminis-
trative Agencies Can Solve the Employment Dispute Quagmire by Endorsing an 
Improved Arbitration System, 26 CORNELL J.L. & POL’Y 217, 261 (2016) 
(“[E]mployers settle cases with bad facts at early stages.”); Jennifer B. Shinall, 
The Substantially Impaired Sex: Uncovering the Gendered Nature of Disability 
Discrimination, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1099, 1116 (2017) (“[E]mployers have a fi-
nancial incentive to settle the most egregious discrimination claims before a 
lawsuit is filed . . . .”). 
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basis.217 A California SB 820-type rule would enable future Har-
vey Weinsteins to continue in that pattern, unless they happen 
to encounter a plaintiff who refuses to settle pre-filing. 
If the ultimate purpose of legislation is to expose misconduct 
that had previously been concealed, California would come closer 
to doing so through a rule that prohibited all such agreements 
(pre-filing or otherwise), or through a rule that only prohibits 
secrecy for pre-filing settlements. A pre-filing rule would permit 
secrecy provisions in settlements after a case has been filed. 
That would enable both parties to use the restrictions to protect 
their reputations, while satisfying the public interest in having 
some record of a claim. Indeed, in recent months, victims have 
used non-disparagement and non-disclosure agreements to their 
advantage, arguing that harassers violated those provisions 
when they suggested that the claimant’s lawsuit lacked merit.218 
Even before the MeToo movement, victims periodically sued to 
enforce non-disparagement and non-disclosure provisions.219 
Another option might be to draft asymmetric legislation that 
would allow the victim to restrain the employer from discussing 
her case without her prior consent, but that would prohibit the 
employer from demanding secrecy from the victim. Such an op-
tion would give the victim elective secrecy—the victim need not 
keep the information secret at a later date but would be assured 
that the employer would keep such information confidential. If 
the victim chooses to speak out at a later date, courts could treat 
 
 217. Gross, supra note 204. 
 218. Gene Maddaus, Two More Accusers Sue Bill O’Reilly for Defamation, 
VARIETY (Dec. 20, 2017), http://variety.com/2017/biz/news/bill-oreilly 
-defamation-more-accusers-1202646279. 
 219. See, e.g., Tomson v. Stephan, 696 F. Supp. 1407, 1407 (D. Kan. 1988) 
(alleging breach of confidentiality provision when defendant asserted publicly 
that the claim was totally unfounded). In Tomson, the claimant ultimately sur-
vived summary judgment based on a separate “false light” publicity claim, 
which challenged the defendant’s public assertions that her claim was totally 
unfounded. Id. at 1412–13; see also Welsh v. City of S.F., No. C-93-3722, 1995 
WL 714350, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 1995) (alleging defamation against police 
chief for calling her harassment lawsuit “absolutely absurd” and “false and ma-
licious”); Wesson v. FMR, LLC, 34 Mass. L. Rptr. 539, 541 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2017) 
(employee sued for breach of settlement provisions relating to providing an em-
ployment reference); Halco v. Davey, 919 A.2d 626, 628 (Me. 2007) (employee 
stated cognizable breach of contract claim based on non-disclosure and non-dis-
paragement provision when sheriff publicly stated that the county “had a really 
good case”). But see Mathis v. Controlled Temperature Inc., No. 275323, 2008 
WL 782634, at *6–7 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2008) (finding breach of non-dis-
paragement provision of settlement agreement where the plaintiff told a pro-
spective employer that she had been harassed and that she won her dispute). 
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such speech as a waiver of the employer’s promise of confidenti-
ality, which would enable the company to respond in the event 
of a public relations crisis. 
C. NO MORE PROMISES OF SECRECY TO THE ACCUSED 
EMPLOYEE 
Perhaps the most significant, and underexamined, effect of 
the legislation will be in limiting employers’ ability to make se-
crecy-related promises to employees accused of harassment. This 
may result in broader policies where employers refuse to make 
secrecy-related promises to any departing executive. On those 
occasions where employers agree to enter into such provisions, 
they will likely be substantially narrowed or include carve outs 
commensurate with the scope of the statute. 
While media coverage of settlement agreements has focused 
almost exclusively on harassment victims, it is also quite com-
mon for departing executives to enter into settlement agree-
ments with employers. Executives entitled to severance under 
their executive employment contracts often include provisions 
requiring them to sign a release to receive that severance.220 In 
addition, employees accused of harassment or other misconduct 
sometimes threaten to sue their employers for claims such as 
 
 220. See, e.g., Richard Harroch, Negotiating Employment Agreements: 
Checklist of 14 Key Issues, FORBES (Nov. 11, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/allbusiness/2013/11/11/negotiating-employment-agreements-checklist-of 
-14-key-issues/#667fd60d24c6 (advising that executives should be required to 
sign a release in order to receive severance); Idexx Laboratories, Form of Exec-
utive Employment Agreement, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https:// 
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/874716/000087471607000002/exh10_ 
5formemployagmt.htm  (last visited Oct. 22, 2018) (requiring executive to sign 
a release to receive severance); Midstates Petroleum Company, Inc., Form of 
Executive Employment Agreement, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https:// 
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1533924/000119312512018816/d248475dex1 
07.htm(same); Symantec Corp., Executive Employment Agreement, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/849399/ 
000119312512366711/d394740dex1001.htm  (last visited Oct. 22, 2018) (same). 
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defamation,221 privacy violations,222 or breach of contract.223 
Even if these claims lack merit,224 the employer may neverthe-
less enter into some form of settlement agreement in order to 
eliminate the risk of any subsequent lawsuit.225 
 
 221. Meyerson v. Harrah’s E. Chi. Casino, 67 F. App’x 967, 968 (7th Cir. 
2003) (affirming summary judgment against defamation claim by accused, be-
cause “truth is a complete defense to defamation”); Welsh, 1995 WL 714350, at 
*9 (statements alleged to be defamatory covered by the litigation privilege); 
Rudebeck v. Paulson, 612 N.W.2d 450, 454 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (manager’s 
defamation claim in response to harassment lawsuit unviable due to qualified 
privilege). 
 222. Smith v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 645 So. 2d 785, 791 (2d Cir. 1994) (qualified 
privilege applies to privacy claims, including false light and “unreasonable pub-
lic disclosure of embarrassing private facts” where “an employer who under-
takes an investigation of employee misconduct is protected by a qualified or con-
ditional privilege when making a statement in good faith, on a subject in which 
the employer has an interest or duty, to persons having a corresponding interest 
or duty”); Lloyd v. Quorum Health Res., LLC, 77 P.3d 993, 1001 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2003) (quoting Dominguez v. Davidson, 974 P.2d 112 (Kan. 1999) (noting that 
elements of false light are: “(1) publication of some kind must be made to a third 
party; (2) the publication must falsely represent the person; and (3) that repre-
sentation must be highly offensive to a reasonable person”)). The court in Lloyd 
also noted that defamation and false light claims are similar in that “truth and 
privilege are defenses available in both causes of action.” Id. at 1002. 
 223. Wong v. Digitas Inc., No. 3:13-CV-00731, 2015 WL 59188, at *3, *7 (D. 
Conn. Jan. 5, 2015) (harassment procedures in anti-harassment policy did not 
create an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine that would require the 
employer to interview the accused before terminating him); Carlton v. Dr. Pep-
per Snapple Grp., Inc., 228 Cal. App. 4th 1200, 1210–11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) 
(breach of contract claim brought by accused employee properly dismissed be-
cause he failed to identify contractual promises that were breached); see also 
Martin v. Baer, 928 F.2d 1067, 1072–73 (11th Cir. 1991) (affirming summary 
judgment claim against accused employee alleging breach of contract and inflic-
tion of emotional distress, which were eventually dismissed on the basis that 
harassment policy did not create an implied duty to those accused of harass-
ment and the absence of intentional conduct on the part of the employer); Orr 
v. Meristar Vt. Beverage Corp., No. 2003-143, 2003 WL 25745111, at *2 (Vt. 
Aug. 2003) (affirming summary judgment on breach of contract claim brought 
by accused). 
 224. See, e.g., Welsh, 1995 WL, 714350 at *4 (accused filed counterclaim 
against harassment plaintiff for defamation, but lost on summary judgment for 
failing to exhaust administrative remedy); Rudebeck v. Ford Motor Co., 612 
N.W.2d 450, 454 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (manager sued employer and complain-
ant for defamation in response to employee’s harassment lawsuit); Rausman v. 
Baugh, 248 A.D.2d 8, 10 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (supervisor terminated for har-
assment brought defamation claim against complainant and the employer). 
 225. For example, accused harassers may have valid claims for indemnifica-
tion under state law. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 2802(a) (West 2016) (providing 
for indemnification for “all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the em-
ployee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her duties”); Rudebeck, 
612 N.W.2d at 455 (quoting Del. Ch. Code § 145(c), noting that Delaware Chan-
cery Code provides for “mandatory indemnification for any person who is a party 
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While settlement agreements are typically drafted to consist 
almost exclusively of promises in the employer’s favor, attorneys 
for departing executives commonly request that certain prom-
ises be made mutual. These include three of the four types of 
provisions previously discussed: non-disclosure provisions, non-
disparagement provisions, and promises to make affirmative 
statements.226 
While employers may have previously been somewhat re-
ceptive to such requests, they would no longer be feasible under 
the proposed legislation. First, a provision where the employer 
promises not to disclose information about the accused in con-
nection with a harassment claim would not be enforceable under 
any of the proposed statutes. Such a provision would clearly pre-
vent or suppress disclosures relating to the harassment.  
Similarly, a broad non-disparagement provision would pre-
vent or have the effect of concealing the employer’s ability to 
speak about the misconduct, which would violate the statute. 
Narrow non-disparagement provisions are difficult to assess 
where they restrain employers. In theory, employers ought to 
understand that a promise not to defame the employee does not 
preclude them from disclosing truthful information. Neverthe-
less, as to accused employees, employers might be fearful that 
repeating or conveying information from the victim could expose 
them to liability and therefore restrict them from speaking. If so, 
such a provision could have the “effect of” concealment, violating 
the proposed New York law.227 
Employers are also likely to be reluctant to provide positive 
recommendation letters as part of a settlement with an accused 
harasser. A letter that contains positive information about the 
accused, while omitting information about the accusations, may 
have the effect of concealing misconduct. 
These same factors might limit an employer’s willingness to 
make secrecy-related promises to any executive in the course of 
negotiating settlement and release agreements upon their de-
parture. Even if an individual has not been accused of miscon-
duct, the employer might later learn of accusations against that 
employee. At that later point in time, those provisions would 
 
to a lawsuit by reason of the fact that he is or was a director, officer, employee 
or agent of the corporation” where the director or officer “has been successful on 
the merits or otherwise in the defense of any action”).  
 226. Non-cooperation clauses are not something that a company would be 
willing to make mutual. 
 227. S. 6382A, 2017 S., Reg. Sess (N.Y. 2017). 
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serve to prevent disclosures of misconduct, in violation of the 
rule. To avoid this problem, employers may prefer to avoid se-
crecy promises in these agreements altogether, or to include 
carve outs for disclosures relating to claims specified in the stat-
ute. 
IV.  VOLUNTARY CHANGES TO DISCIPLINARY 
PRACTICES   
Employers are likely to make substantial changes to their 
practices beyond those compelled by law. The MeToo movement 
produced a substantial shift in the risks associated with harass-
ment claims.228 Before MeToo, harassment was viewed as a risk 
that employers could largely contain. Harassment is not a new 
legal risk; employers now have some thirty years of experience 
in dealing with harassment claims. Consequently,229 harass-
ment claims were routine enough to be viewed as a cost of doing 
business, which did not demand substantial scrutiny or revision 
of their practices. In addition, employers could mitigate the risk 
of a large lawsuit through Employment Practices Liability In-
surance, which can cover both the fees and the settlement or 
judgment associated with harassment claims.230 
MeToo altered this calculus considerably because employees 
suddenly felt free to air their experiences of harassment publicly. 
This imposed reputational costs overlooked in prior decision 
making by employers. The risk of bad publicity is less managea-
ble, and potentially far greater, than the risk of litigation. First, 
 
 228. Jena McGregor, Fear and Panic in the H.R. Department as Sexual Har-
assment Allegations Multiply, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2017/11/30/fear-and-panic-in-the 
-h-r-department-as-sexual-harassment-allegations-multiply (quoting H.R. con-
sultant, who stated: “The playbook for H.R., when it comes to sexual harass-
ment, is a 25- to 30-year-old playbook,” in which “[e]mployees made a complaint, 
H.R. took time to investigate, and the matter generally stayed private until it 
could be resolved”). 
 229. Id. 
 230. See, e.g., HISCOX LTD., THE 2017 HISCOX GUIDE TO EMPLOYEE LAW-
SUITS HANDBOOK, 1, 6 (2017), https://www.hiscox.com/documents/2017-Hiscox 
-Guide-to-Employee-Lawsuits.pdf (among employment charges that resulted in 
defense and settlement, average cost was $160,000; insured company’s out-of-
pocket cost in connection with those charges was $50,000); EPLI Claims Reach 
Tipping Point Amid Anti-Sexual Harassment Movement, MYNEWMARKETS.COM 
(Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.mynewmarkets.com/articles/183182/epli-claims 
-reach-tipping-point-amid-anti-sexual-harassment-movement (noting “[t]he in-
surance industry is expecting a wave of employment practices liability insur-
ance (EPLI) claims to roll in following the recent storm of sexual harassment 
allegations,” and that EPLI policies will most likely cover such claims). 
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public grievances are not confined to the statute of limitations, 
which require plaintiffs to file with the EEOC less than a year 
after the discrimination occurred.231 Employees might complain 
publicly about harassment that occurred years or even decades 
prior. Second, public complaints are not subject to the legal con-
straints that tend to cabin an employer’s liability. The court of 
public opinion is not so concerned about whether the conduct met 
the formal legal requirements for severe or pervasive conduct or 
whether the employer’s response was legally reasonable. MeToo 
revealed the chasm between public expectations and legal reali-
ties, portraying employer practices as unfair, and employees’ 
treatment as outrageous.232 
Social media makes brands precarious at a time when brand 
and reputation represent a substantial part of a company’s 
value. In some cases, the brand may be most of a company’s 
value. The Weinstein company filed for bankruptcy.233 Wynn Re-
sorts lost $2 billion in stock value after its founder and chief ex-
ecutive faced harassment accusations.234 Venerable media 
brands, including NBC, PBS, NPR, and CBS have seen their 
public image tarnished. In recent months, public revelations 
have shifted from accusations involving celebrities to those in-
volving previously unknown executives at well-known compa-
nies and non-profits like Nike, Bank of America, Humane Soci-
ety, the New York City Ballet, and Monster Energy.235 
 
 231. The filing deadline depends on whether a state or local agency enforces 
a similar law, in which case the usual 180-day deadline is extended to 300 days. 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/ 
employees/timeliness.cfm (last visited Oct. 22, 2018). 
 232. MeToo is a variation of what scholars have been saying for some time—
albeit in much more theoretical fashion—that employers have not done right by 
victims, and the law has not done enough to help. Scholars, however, assumed 
the law would lead in fixing the problem, and there was at least some reason to 
think that might be the case. Catharine MacKinnon has argued that judicial 
opinions recognizing harassment predated and indeed altered cultural shifts 
and changing norms around harassment. See Catharine MacKinnon, The Logic 
of Experience: Reflections on the Development of Sexual Harassment Law, 90 
GEO. L.J. 813, 817 (2002). But MeToo produced a different course of events, 
where changing cultural norms act directly on employer practices, with or with-
out changing legal rules. 
 233. Barnes, supra note 6.  
 234. John Foley, Wynn Resorts’ Slide Shows Sexual Misconduct Is a Finan-
cial Risk, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/26/ 
business/dealbook/steve-wynn-sexual-misconduct.html. 
 235. Sarah Almukhtar et al., After Weinstein: 68 Men Accused of Sexual Mis-
conduct and Their Fall from Power, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www 
.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/11/10/us/men-accused-sexual-misconduct 
-weinstein.html; Julie Creswell et al., At Nike, Revolt Led by Women Leads to 
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Harassment, previously viewed as a contained liability, has mor-
phed into a bet-the-company risk.236 
This shift imposes a form of forced transparency on employ-
ers, where they must presume that misconduct might make its 
way to the public stage and they will have to defend their ap-
proach to an angry public. Legal reforms will exacerbate con-
cerns about bad publicity as employers can no longer contain vic-
tims through contracts and policies. 
Within this environment, employers are also likely to face 
heightened legal risks. The MeToo movement may embolden 
more complainants to come forward about their experiences of 
harassment, which increases the number of potential lawsuits 
employers face. If courts ultimately relax the standard for severe 
or pervasive harassment and demand more of employers at-
tempting to establish the Faragher defense, employers face 
greater potential liability. These risks put pressure on employers 
to identify ways to limit their exposure to future claims. 
Employers are now changing their practices, and will likely 
continue to do so, as explained in greater detail below. Employ-
ers have already proven more willing to terminate documented 
harassers.237 This newfound willingness to terminate will also 
open up alternate avenues for meaningful discipline that em-
ployers previously avoided, such as demotions, promotion deni-
als, and substantial pay cuts. Employers may also revise their 
privacy policies, and draft broader definitions of “cause” in their 
executive employment agreements. While investigation pro-
cesses have been the subject of some criticism during the MeToo 
movement, those critiques conflate the employer’s processes 
with the results-oriented approach employers previously took to 
discipline. 
 
Exodus of Male Executives, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2018/04/28/business/nike-women.html; Emily Peck, Monster Energy Vice 
President Accused of Sexual Harassment Resigns, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 31, 
2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/monster-energy-john-kenneally 
-resigns_us_5a722351e4b05253b275370a; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Matthew 
Goldstein, Bank of America Executive Departs After Misconduct Claim, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/19/business/bank-of 
-america-sexual-misconduct-omeed-malik.html.  
 236. McGregor, supra note 228 (human resources consultant characterizing 
employers as “worried these meteorites [complaints] could be coming . . . but 
they have no idea how to protect their house”). 
 237. Id.; Elisabeth Ponsot, All the Media Men Held to a Higher Standard 
than Trump, Starting with Billy Bush, QZ (Nov. 29, 2017), https://qz.com/ 
1141014/matt-lauer-to-charlie-rose-all-the-media-men-held-to-a-higher-sexual 
-misconduct-standard-than-donald-trump. 
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A. INVESTIGATIONS ARE NOT THE PROBLEM 
The MeToo crisis subjected employer complaint and investi-
gation processes to scrutiny on several different fronts. One form 
of scrutiny, generally characterized as the due process critique, 
worries that employers are rushing to judgment and failing to 
investigate harassment complaints with sufficient care.238 This 
critique was often invoked in connection with the Matt Lauer 
scandal, where NBC terminated Lauer within a few days of 
when it first received a formal employee complaint.239 
A second critique takes the opposite position: that employer 
investigations serve only to paper over a file by documenting 
weaknesses in the employee’s claim to protect from a future har-
assment lawsuit.240 In this view, the employer was not taking an 
even-handed view of the complainant’s allegations, but instead 
trying to game the facts in its favor. A third line of attack argued 
that employees don’t use internal complaint systems because 
they don’t trust them.241 Critics thus advocated for processes 
that employees find more trustworthy.242 
 
 238. Constance Grady, Are Men Accused of Harassment Being Denied Their 
Due Process? Or Are the Victims?, VOX (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.vox.com/ 
culture/2018/1/6/16855434/weinstein-reckoning-sexual-harassment-due 
-process-daphne-merkin-keillor-franken. 
 239. See Christine Emba, The Due Process Assault Freak-Out Is a Fever 
Dream, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ 
the-due-process-assault-freak-out-is-a-fever-dream/2017/12/01/8f14cd80-d6d5 
-11e7-a986-d0a9770d9a3e_story.html. 
 240. Noam Scheiber & Julie Cresswell, Sexual Harassment Cases Show the 
Ineffectiveness of Going to H.R., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/business/sexual-harassment-human-resources.html; 
Tovia Smith, When It Comes to Sexual Harassment Claims, Whose Side Is HR 
Really On?, NPR (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/11/15/564032999/ 
when-it-comes-to-sexual-harassment-claims-whose-side-is-hr-really-on. 
 241. Danny Crichton, HR Has Lost the Trust of Employees. Here Is Who Has 
It Now, TECH CRUNCH (Feb. 10, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/10/hr 
-has-lost-the-trust-of-employees-here-is-who-has-it-now. 
 242. In response, a number of third-party complaint handlers have popped 
up following MeToo, claiming to provide impartial information collection and 
investigation for employers. Elizabeth Dwoskin & Jena McGregor, Sexual Har-
assment Inc.: How the #MeToo Movement Is Sparking a Wave of Start-ups, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on 
-leadership/wp/2018/01/05/sexual-harassment-inc-how-the-metoo-movement-is 
-sparking-a-wave-of-startups. A 2012 proposal by Ian Ayres and Cait Unkovic 
to use “information escrows” to gather employee complaints has also received 
considerable attention. Ian Ayres & Cait Unkovic, Information Escrows, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 145, 147 (2012); see also Conor Friedersdorf, How to Identify Se-
rial Harassers in the Workplace, ATLANTIC (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.the 
atlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/11/whisper-networks-20/546311. Their sys-
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Contrary to both the first and second critique, employers are 
quite capable at getting to the bottom of the factual issues and 
can do so quite efficiently. It is their refusal to act on what they 
know that made the process appear flawed, and eroded trust in 
the system. 
Employers have always been quite careful about their inves-
tigation practices, and are likely to remain so.243 The due process 
critique suggests a lack of familiarity with the speed and effi-
ciency of harassment investigations.244 Many harassment inves-
tigations are relatively straightforward. The employer inter-
views the complainant and the accused, as well as any other 
witnesses that either party identifies as having relevant infor-
mation about the alleged harassment.245 If any of the interview-
ees identify relevant written evidence—such as e-mails or text 
 
tem would involve a third party that promises to maintain the secrecy of infor-
mation provided unless enumerated conditions have been met, for example, if 
two or more people complain about the same person. Ayres & Unkovic, supra, 
at 147. An information escrow, they argue, would avoid the “first-mover disad-
vantage,” a reluctance on the part of harassment victims to be the first person 
to complain. Id. 
These technological solutions, however, represent a solution to the wrong 
problem. They presume the problem is the employers’ failure to conduct a proper 
investigation (either too favorable to the complainant or to the accused), which 
then distorts their judgment at the end. But the problem never was the way 
employers collected information. It was what employers did with the infor-
mation—or more to the point, failed to do—once it had already been gathered. 
 243. Employers benefit from a qualified privilege from defamation for state-
ments made in connection with an investigation. However, that privilege may 
be unavailable if the employer “makes allegations without investigation or iden-
tifying the source of complaints.” Rudebeck v. Paulson, 612 N.W.2d 450, 454 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
 244. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Of Power and Process: Handling Harassers 
in an At-Will World, 128 YALE L.J. F. 85, 87 (2018) (observing that “harassers 
arguably get more due process than at-will employees . . . owing to their em-
ployers’ efforts to protect themselves from victims’ lawsuits”). 
 245. See, e.g., Sabrina Dunlap & Heather Sussman, Investigating Sexual 
Harassment Complaints: Procedures and Guidelines, in DRAFTING EMPLOY-
MENT DOCUMENTS IN MASSACHUSETTS, at exhibit 15B (Michael Rosen ed., 2016) 
(“WHO to Interview: [c]omplainant, [a]lleged harasser, [w]itnesses, [a]ny per-
sons whom complainant and/or alleged harasser identify as persons with 
knowledge, [a]ny persons whom company believes may have knowledge.”); Mer-
rick Rossein, First Prong of Affirmative Defense: Preventing or Correcting Har-
assment, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW & LITIGATION § 5:27 (2018) 
(“Investigations generally are conducted when the target of harassment, the al-
leged harasser, and any witnesses are interviewed without the presence of a 
coworker or representative.”). 
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messages—the employer will collect those as well.246 The com-
pany will then decide which facts are disputed, and if they are 
disputed, which witness was most credible in their account.247 If 
the investigation only involves a few witnesses and a small quan-
tity of documents, an employer could easily get to the bottom of 
the matter reasonably quickly. 
Employers are unlikely to start cutting corners on their in-
vestigations in the MeToo era. Conducting a defensible investi-
gation has always formed part of successfully asserting the Fa-
ragher defense, and therefore will remain part of the playbook 
for defending against claims brought by the victim. Employers 
also tend to be thorough in their investigations to protect against 
claims brought by the accused. A flimsy or incomplete investiga-
tion risks producing factual errors. In an environment where em-
ployers might feel compelled to disclose the results of their in-
vestigation, a diligent process and a high degree of certainty 
about the accuracy of the results, protects against potential def-
amation and false light claims.248 In other words, robust investi-
gation practices will remain a good investment for employers. 
The second critique—that employers document the investi-
gation in a way that favors their interests—is accurate, but less 
consequential than it seems. Employers essentially conduct two 
investigations at once. One is the documented version that tells 
a story most favorable to the employer. The second is an unoffi-
cial, undocumented, and unflinching assessment of the problem 
for purpose of accurately gauging potential liability. This is the 
version that human resources tells to the legal department or 
outside counsel over the phone. It is also the version upon which 
the employer makes a decision.249 
 
 246. See Dunlap & Sussman, supra note 245, at exhibit 15B; McGregor, su-
pra note 228 (reporting that “[w]ith clear evidence more often available in the 
form of e-mails, texts or other electronic posts . . . the days of he-said, she-said 
have essentially been eliminated by technology” because “somebody’s got a 
screenshot somewhere”). 
 247. See David Benck & Tessa Thrasher Hughes, Empoloyment/Labor Law, 
20 ACCA DOCKET no. 3, 72, 82–83 (Mar. 2002) (“The investigator should review 
the statements provided by the complainant, the alleged harasser, and the wit-
nesses and assess the veracity of all concerned.”); Buchanan Ingersoll, How to 
Conduct a Harassment Investigation, 9 PA. EMP. L. LETTER, no. 11, 2 (1999). 
 248. See infra notes 252–56. 
 249. It is true that the paper record does not fairly portray the plaintiff ’s 
claims in the event of subsequent litigation. However, should the case proceed 
to litigation, the plaintiff can construct their own account through the discovery 
process, and portray the employer’s records as biased. 
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Ultimately, the flaw in employer processes has not been the 
investigation process but results-oriented decision making that 
tends to favor inaction. Before MeToo, employers had strong 
business incentives to take nonpunitive responses to harass-
ment, particularly where the harasser was perceived as valuable 
to the business.250 This disciplinary failure led victims to lose 
confidence in the employer’s complaint process, and made em-
ployees reluctant to complain. By contrast, in an environment 
where companies hold employees accountable for harassment, 
complainants are more likely to view the employer as an honest 
broker and consequently make use of the internal processes 
available to them. 
B. THREAT OF TERMINATION MAKES OTHER TYPES OF 
DISCIPLINE POSSIBLE 
As previously noted, in the MeToo era, employers seem more 
willing to terminate high-level harassers following an investiga-
tion. Terminating the harasser serves several purposes. First, it 
prevents other employees in the workplace from being affected. 
Second, it removes constraints on the victim’s career, which 
might otherwise be compromised through a continued reporting 
relationship to the harasser or a transfer to another department. 
Third, it mollifies the victim, making them less likely to publicly 
complain about harassment. Lastly, it provides a defensible 
story about the employer’s response if the harassment is later 
publicly disclosed. 
Once termination becomes a common response to harass-
ment, it also makes other meaningful forms of discipline—like a 
demotion or promotion denial—possible. 
This argument seems counterintuitive, but it aligns with 
theory and practice from the field of negotiation. In the negotia-
tion context, the value of a proposed agreement is measured in 
terms of the harasser’s best alternative to a negotiated agree-
ment (BATNA).251 In a pre-MeToo context, executives assumed 
that their employer would be reluctant to terminate them, and 
would almost certainly not disclose their termination publicly, 
because it would be too costly to the employer’s reputation. Ex-
ecutives also knew that they might be difficult to replace, and 
 
 250. Arnow-Richman, supra note 244, at 87 (“We need greater institutional 
accountability for the conduct of the those at the top of the workplace hierarchy, 
alongside greater protection for the rank-and-file.”). 
 251. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES 99 (Bruce Patton ed., 
3d ed. 2011). 
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that the loss of revenue associated with their talent would be 
salient. If the company imposed discipline that the executive 
would find unpalatable, the executive could always leave to work 
for a competitor. In negotiation terms, the executive’s BATNA 
was quite good. Even though companies did not negotiate explic-
itly with employees over the terms of their discipline, they would 
have chosen a form of discipline that was preferable to the exec-
utive’s BATNA. So, the companies would select superficial forms 
of discipline, like training, or a letter in the harasser’s personnel 
file. 
The MeToo movement altered the balance of power between 
highly positioned harassers and companies. Executives now 
know that the employer would seriously consider termination, 
and may even do so publicly, for all of the reasons previously 
described. Executives also know that if they quit, their prospects 
for reemployment may not be as good as they once were, since 
companies may perform more due diligence regarding whether 
the executive had been accused of misconduct. The executive’s 
BATNA is substantially worse. This gives the company a lot 
more latitude to impose serious discipline. The company knows 
that the executive is unlikely to quit. While the company could 
simply terminate the employee, it now has the flexibility to im-
pose other forms of meaningful discipline, like a demotion, loss 
of supervisory responsibility, promotion denial, pay cut, transfer 
to an undesirable location, or a zero on their annual performance 
review. 
Depending on the context, these intermediate forms of dis-
cipline might be appropriate. For example, a demotion or trans-
fer for the accused might make it possible for the victim to con-
tinue on the preexisting career path with minimal disruption. It 
may also reduce the harasser’s power and status, which will 
cabin the harasser’s opportunity to harass others. And, depend-
ing on the context, an intermediate form of discipline might be 
proportional to the misconduct and support a defensible narra-
tive should the harassment later become public. 
C. WARNINGS IN PRIVACY POLICIES THAT DISCIPLINARY 
DECISIONS MAY BE DISCLOSED 
MeToo also altered employers’ willingness to publicly dis-
close a decision to terminate a documented harasser following an 
investigation. Employers previously treated personnel files as 
sacrosanct and attempted to avoid public terminations of high-
level employees at any cost. High-level executives accused of 
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misconduct who were effectively terminated were given the op-
tion to resign in public. Part of this was in the company’s finan-
cial interests; revealing employee misconduct would reflect 
poorly on the company. Employers were also worried about liti-
gious former executives who might threaten a defamation 
claim252 or even a “false light” invasion of privacy claim.253 Me-
Too changed this calculus because the allegations of harassment 
were in many cases already public or soon to be made public. In 
this context, a public disclosure of employee discipline did not 
produce a public scandal so much as mitigate it. 
Crises have a way of focusing a company’s attention on pol-
icies and contracts that created risks associated with its pre-
ferred course of action. One such source of risk is its policy 
around privacy. Employee privacy is a flexible concept that de-
rives from a combination of reasonable employee expectations, 
 
 252. For a statement to be defamatory it must be “communicated to someone 
other than the plaintiff, it must be false, and it must tend to harm the plaintiff ’s 
reputation and to lower him or her in the estimation of the community.” Lewis 
v. Equitable Life Assurance, Soc’y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 886 (Minn. 1986). However, 
employers can assert a qualified privilege. Id. at 889–90. Where an employer 
can establish qualified privilege, the plaintiff must show “bad faith, actual mal-
ice, or abuse of the privilege through excess publication.” Garziano v. E.I. Du 
Pont De Nemours & Co., 818 F.2d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1987). Where “management 
honestly and sincerely believed [the complainant’s] allegations of sexual har-
assment . . . there [was] insufficient evidence in the record to support the alle-
gations of malice or bad faith.” Id. at 390 (employer’s internal bulletin about 
sexual harassment was subject to a qualified privilege). In that case, the court 
reasoned that: “Co-workers have a legitimate interest in the reasons a fellow 
employee was discharged. Of course, employees have a strong interest in not 
being fired. An employer also has an interest in maintaining employee morale 
and protecting its business interests.” Id. at 387 (citations omitted); see also 
Turner v. Wells, 198 F. Supp. 3d 1355, 1371–72, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (holding 
that a law firm’s public investigation findings and conclusions not actionable 
defamation because statements were not false or were pure opinion); Ludlow v. 
Nw. Univ., 79 F. Supp. 3d 824, 829 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (dismissing false light and 
defamation claims, because university’s statements were “substantially true” or 
not “highly offensive”); Bisso v. De Freest, 251 A.D.2d 953, 953 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1998) (qualified privilege protected employer’s statement to other employees 
that accused had been terminated for harassment). 
 253. “False light” is a related privacy claim—which refers to publicity that 
places an individual in a false light that “would be highly offensive to a reason-
able person” and in “reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized mat-
ter.” Tomson v. Stephan, 696 F. Supp. 1407, 1410 (D. Kan. 1988); see also Lloyd 
v. Quorum Health Res., LLC, 31 Kan. App. 2d 943, 954 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003) 
(quoting Dominguez v. Davidson, 266 Kan. 926, 937 (1999) (noting that ele-
ments of false light are: “(1) publication of some kind must be made to a third 
party; (2) the publication must falsely represent the person; and (3) that repre-
sentation must be highly offensive to a reasonable person”)). 
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and employer behavior and promises that bolster or undermine 
those expectations.254 
Employees sometimes assert false light privacy claims, 
which requires them to prove that the company engaged in pub-
licity that “falsely represent[s] the person” and is “highly offen-
sive to a reasonable person.”255 However, employers have a qual-
ified privilege if they investigate the claim and the statement 
was made in good faith to persons with an interest or duty in the 
subject matter.256 The best protection against such a claim, as 
previously noted, is a diligent investigation that produces a high 
degree of certainty as to the accuracy of the findings. Employers 
are also likely to remain restrained about public comments be-
cause they will need to explain why the public had an interest in 
the findings to avail themselves of the qualified privilege. 
Nevertheless, on the rare occasion where employers decide 
to make a public disclosure (or even an internal disclosure that 
may find its way to social media), revisions to the privacy policy 
provide a marginal benefit. In privacy cases generally, questions 
of the offensiveness of an intrusion will depend in part on expec-
tations of privacy. These expectations are influenced by the em-
ployer’s conduct.257 
An employer’s policies and practices regarding personnel 
files and personnel information is somewhat relevant to whether 
an employee can establish a privacy claim in connection with 
public disclosure of that personnel information. Historically, em-
ployers were extremely reluctant to disclose anything in an em-
ployee’s personnel file,258 particularly findings of misconduct and 
discipline resulting from those findings. This secrecy extended 
 
 254. See Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 621–23 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 255. See Lloyd, 31 Kan. App. 2d at 954; supra note 253. 
 256. Smith v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 645 So. 2d 785, 791 (2d Cir. 1994) (qualified 
privilege applies to privacy claims, including false light and “unreasonable pub-
lic disclosure of embarrassing private facts” where “an employer who under-
takes an investigation of employee misconduct is protected by a qualified or con-
ditional privilege when making a statement in good faith, on a subject in which 
the employer has an interest or duty, to persons having a corresponding interest 
or duty”). 
 257. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 710 (1987) (where employer provided 
employee with the only key to certain physical locations, which were not typi-
cally accessed by others, employee more likely to have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in that location). 
 258. Thomas Wilson & Corey Devine, Privacy in the Employment Relation-
ship, PRACTICAL LAW LABOR & EMPLOYMENT (2018) (“Personnel records should 
be maintained in a secure location, such as a locked file cabinet or password-
protected electronic files. They should be made available only to individuals 
with a legitimate business need to access the files.”). 
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even to the victim who complained of harassment in the first 
place, who might never learn whether the accused employee re-
ceived any discipline at all. This practice might theoretically bol-
ster an employee’s claim that they had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in that information, and that disclosing such infor-
mation was highly offensive.259 
Employer policies rarely make promises that all personnel 
information will be kept confidential. They have not, however, 
sought to disclaim those expectations either. By contrast, em-
ployers have been quite thorough in disclaiming employee rights 
to privacy in several other types of information, which they tend 
to update as technology develops.260 For example, employee pri-
vacy policies (often called “computer use policies”) frequently dis-
claim any right to privacy of any information on a company-
 
 259. I use the term “theoretically” because there are very few cases in the 
private sector alleging pure “invasion of privacy” claims based on disciplinary 
disclosures, as opposed to claims for defamation or false light publicity, where 
truth is an absolute defense. McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 622 
(3d Cir. 1996) (no invasion of privacy claim where store manager told employee’s 
relatives that the plaintiff resigned because of his health, and where “an uni-
dentified store employee [told a friend of the plaintiff ]  who already knew that 
he was HIV-positive”); Magdaluyo v. MGM Grand Hotel LLC, Case No. 2:14–
cv–01806, 2017 WL 736875, at *4 (D. Nev. Feb. 24, 2017) (no cognizable invasion 
of privacy claim based on allegations that employer spread rumors about him); 
cf. Allen v. Verizon Wireless, No. 3:12–cv–482, 2013 WL 2467923, at *8 (D. 
Conn. June 6, 2013) (cognizable privacy allegations based on unauthorized ac-
cess to FMLA certification and contact with plaintiff ’s doctor). The analysis 
herein draws upon other types of privacy cases from the employment context; 
public employees have additional privacy-related protections under the Fourth 
Amendment. See, e.g., O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 709; Borse, 963 F.2d at 618. 
 260. See, e.g., Greenhaus, supra note 192 (policy prohibiting harassment on 
computer systems, and disclaiming any expectation of privacy in any “message, 
file, data, document, fascimile, telephone conversation, social media post, con-
versation, or any other kind or form of information or communication transmit-
ted to, received, or printed from, or stored or recorded on the company’s elec-
tronic information and communications systems”). 
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owned computer, on the employee’s internet usage on that com-
puter, or on company e-mail.261 Employers may also reveal vari-
ous forms of surveillance through their privacy policies.262 How-
ever, employers have not yet included personnel files, 
misconduct, and discipline in the list of information for which 
employees should not expect to have a right to privacy.263 
The strength of privacy claims based on public disclosures 
of discipline is somewhat unknown, since such practices used to 
be quite uncommon. However, MeToo revealed that protecting a 
company’s reputation may require it to publicly disclose discipli-
nary or termination decisions, and investigation results. Em-
ployers may also feel greater pressure to disclose such infor-
mation to others within the organization, for example, to disclose 
the information to leadership to make them aware of a potential 
scandal. After MeToo, employers may also decide that it is in 
their best interests to disclose disciplinary decisions to the vic-
tim.264 
 
 261. Cecil A. Lynn III, Enforcement of Employer Computer Privacy Policies, 
A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/labor_ 
law/meetings/2008/ac2008/070.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2018); 
Sindy J. Policy, A Sample Company Policy on E-mail and Internet Usage, 
A.B.A., https://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/ndpolicy1.html (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2018); Jeanne Sahadi, Can Your Employer See Everything You Do on 
Your Company Phone?, CNN MONEY (Aug. 27, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/ 
2015/08/27/pf/using-smartphones-from-work/index.html. 
 262. Stephen P. Pepe et al., Corporate Policy on Employee Privacy and Elec-
tronic Technology, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE SERIES: DESIGNING AN EFFEC-
TIVE FAIR HIRING AND TERMINATION COMPLIANCE PROGRAM § 4:25 (9th ed. 
2018) (providing a sample policy that states: “In the past, some employees have 
assumed that information accessed through or stored on the computer they use 
at work, or generated as part of [name of corporation] ’s electronic mail, instant 
messaging, text messaging or voice mail systems was private. That assumption 
is incorrect”). 
 263. See PG&E CODE OF CONDUCT 1, 34 (2018), http://www.pgecorp.com/ 
aboutus/pdfs/PGE_EmployeeCodeConduct_MECH_Digital_AltLinks.pdf (not-
ing that employees have “no expectation of privacy” in using a PG&E work 
space, computer, telephone, or other system); Greenhaus, supra note 192 (con-
taining no reference to personnel files in the IT Resources and Communications 
Systems Policy); Pepe, supra note 262 (containing no disclaimer regarding per-
sonnel files).  
 264. See Bisso v. De Freest, 251 A.D.2d 953, 953 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (hold-
ing that a statement made at a staff meeting was protected by qualified privi-
lege because “employees [had] worked with plaintiff ”  and “had a legitimate in-
terest in knowing that [a] serious sanction had been imposed for violation of a 
workplace rule”); RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T. LAW § 6.02, cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 
2014) (stating that qualified privilege applies to statements made to “employer’s 
own employees and agents” and that “not all jurisdictions recognize intra-em-
ployer or intra-corporate communications as publications for purposes of defa-
mation law”). For example, in Smith v. Arkansas Lousiana Gas Co., a number 
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Consequently, employers may add disclaimers in their pri-
vacy policies providing that employees do not have a right to pri-
vacy based on their own misconduct, and that employers reserve 
the right to disclose investigation results and discipline.265 
D. BROADER DEFINITIONS OF “CAUSE” IN EXECUTIVE 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS 
The background rule under American law is employment-
at-will, where employees can be terminated at any time for any 
reason or no reason, with or without notice.266 Most employees 
are subject to the at-will rule, and if they have a contract, it in-
corporates the presumption of at-will employment.267 However, 
high level executives are more likely to have employment agree-
ments with individually negotiated terms.268 These executives in 
many cases remain at-will, in the sense that employers do not 
place any restriction on their ability to fire even an executive at 
 
of employees complained about abusive language and harassing behavior by a 
mid-level department manager. 645 So.2d 785, 791 (La. Ct. App. 1994). Follow-
ing an investigation, the manager was demoted. Id. A handful of managers were 
informed of the demotion, as well as thirty to thirty-five other personnel who 
worked in the accused manager’s facility. Id. The court held that the disclosures 
were made in good faith because the company had “reason to believe they were 
truthful” as a result of their investigation. Id. 
 265. But see Denver Policeman’s Protective Ass’n v. Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d 
432, 436 (10th Cir. 1981) (determining that a discovery order for the disclosure 
of personnel files in litigation did not contravene a right to privacy); Holland, 
Hart LLP, Montana Supreme Court Stresses Right of Privacy in Employment 
Records, 18 MONT. EMP. L. LETTER no. 11, 4 (Dec. 2013) (“Employees in Mon-
tana have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their personnel files.”). 
 266. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T. LAW § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2013). 
 267. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 376 (Cal. 1988). 
 268. Arnow-Richman, supra note 244, at 92. 
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a moment’s notice.269 However, such agreements can impose sub-
stantial severance payments for terminations other than for 
cause.270 
The combination of stock and severance can cost a company 
millions of dollars. One famous case involved former Hewlett 
Packard CEO Mark Hurd, who was terminated in connection 
with a harassment scandal, and nevertheless walked away with 
a severance package valued at $34.5 million.271 Although share-
holders sued over the payout, arguing that the termination met 
the definition for a “cause” termination, the Board evidently did 
not feel sufficiently confident in a “cause” finding to send Hurd 
packing without severance.272 
“Cause” definitions can vary, depending on past practice and 
the amount of power wielded by the executive.273 For those with 
the most bargaining leverage, cause can be defined quite nar-
 
 269. This is somewhat equivalent to at-will employment in the sense that 
the employer can terminate the employee without notice as long as it is willing 
to provide severance pay in lieu of notice. Agreement: Executive Employment 
Agreement, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (May 17, 2016), https:// 
webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:yzj-XCQMWnsJ:https://www 
.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/hr-forms/pages/ 
executiveemploymentagreement.aspx (providing a form agreement which con-
tains a three year employment term, subject to a notice period to be specified by 
contracting parties, and severance pay in lieu of notice provision). But see Exec-
utive Employment Contract Between Geovic, Inc. & Gary Morris (Apr. 17, 2006), 
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
1398005/000102189007000084/geovicform10ex1011.htm (stating that the com-
pany must provide thirty days’ notice and severance if the executive is termi-
nated for reasons other than cause); Key Executive Employment Contract: Allen 
v. Ambrose (Mar. 10, 2003), U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www 
.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1030219/000103221003000497/dex1015.htm 
(providing for sixty days’ notice, approval by a majority of the board, severance, 
and payment for unexercised stock options in the event of termination without 
cause).  
 270. See, e.g., Executive Employment Contract with Barry Berlin (Dec. 15, 
2011), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/908311/000119312512501007/ 
d454051dex102.htm (providing for “termination pay in an amount equal to 2.99 
times the average of the last three years compensation” if the agreement is ter-
minated by the company for any reason other than cause); Form of Executive 
Employment Agreement - John P. Foley, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1533924/000119312512018816/ 
d248475dex107.htm (providing for bonus payments and twelve months of sev-
erance in the event of termination without cause). 
 271. Mary Thompson, HP CEO Hurd’s Severance Pay Could Hit $40 Million: 
Experts, CNBC (Aug. 9, 2010), https://www.cnbc.com/id/38624369. 
 272. Id. 
 273. See also Arnow-Richman, supra note 244, at 92–93 (noting that “egre-
gious harassment could fall within some” definitions of cause but not others). 
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rowly, consisting of gross negligence, bankruptcy, death, physi-
cal or mental incapacity, conviction of a felony or gross misde-
meanor, or willful fraud or misconduct that materially damages 
the company.274 As applied to a harassment case, a company 
bound by a contract of this sort would need to show that the har-
assment resulted in “materia[l] damage” to the company in order 
to qualify as cause. If the harassment hasn’t yet been made pub-
lic, it may not have yet done material damage, thus giving rise 
to a dispute over the contract terms. A risk averse company 
might respond by providing a partial or full severance payout in 
exchange for a release of all claims under the contract. 
Other types of contract provisions can give rise to disputes 
over whether an executive is entitled to severance. For example, 
some contract provisions provide that a company may not termi-
nate the executive for a violation of company policy without a 
certain period of notice and an opportunity for the executive to 
“cure” the violation, “if curable.”275 Such language would give 
rise to a dispute over whether harassing conduct is in fact “cur-
able.”276 The executive’s lawyer might argue that harassment is 
curable, through coaching and training, and a promise not to en-
gage in further misconduct. For its part, the company would ar-
gue that it is not curable, since the harassment has already oc-
curred and the executive cannot undo or fix the misconduct. 
However, the question of curability would likely be sufficiently 
 
 274. See, e.g., Executive Employment Contract between Geovic, Inc. & Gary 
Morris, supra note 269 (stating that conviction of a crime, among other condi-
tions, is cause for termination); Key Executive Employment Contract: Allen v. 
Ambrose, supra note 269 (defining cause to include a willful breach of the agree-
ment and gross negligence); see also Bryan Sullivan, Kevin Spacey and Harvey 
Weinstein Employment Agreements Say a Lot About Hollywood, FORBES (Nov. 
15, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalentertainment/2017/11/15/kevin 
-spacey-and-harvey-weinstein-employment-agreements-say-a-lot-about 
-hollywood/#4e3ba40f573c (stating that Weinstein’s contract specified that har-
assment would trigger a fine). 
 275. See, e.g., Executive Employment Contract between Geovic, Inc. & Gary 
Morris, supra note 269 (stating that the employee has a right to notice and 
twenty-one days to cure in the event of conduct “that has damaged or will likely 
damage the reputation or standing of the company”); Erik Sherman, Harvey 
Weinstein’s Ultimate Enabler Is His Employment Contract, Says a New Report, 
INC. (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.inc.com/erik-sherman/harvey-weinsteins 
-ultimate-enabler-is-his-employment-contract-says-a-new-report.html (stating 
that Weinstein’s contract provided that harm which resulted from harassment 
would be “cured” each time he paid a fine). 
 276. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 244, at 94 (discussing harassment case 
involving a dispute over curability). 
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contested that the company may be tempted to settle a dispute 
of this sort, again in exchange for partial or full severance.277 
Going forward, companies will likely draft their contracts in 
a way that avoids these costs in the event of harassment. This 
could be readily accomplished by defining cause to include “a de-
termination by the company, in its sole discretion, that executive 
has violated the company’s policy against harassment, discrimi-
nation, or retaliation.” Moreover, corporate boards and insur-
ance companies may push for broader definitions of cause to en-
sure that decisions will not be skewed by the financial penalties 
of termination. 
In summary, employers are likely to take more punitive ap-
proaches to harassment, and to alter their policies and contracts 
to provide them with the latitude to carry out that discipline. 
V.  FIXING HARASSMENT & DISCRIMINATION POLICIES   
This Part argues that broadly drafted harassment policies 
contributed to some of the harms revealed by the MeToo move-
ment. Broadly worded policies gave employers the discretion to 
enforce their policies selectively, in some cases applying it 
strictly to address the risk of future discrimination claims, and 
in other cases declining to intervene if the conduct did not meet 
the legal definition of harassment. Because employees were 
never informed of the way employers applied the harassment 
policy, the policies themselves have become suspect, leading 
some to question whether employers should apply a zero toler-
ance harassment policy.278 
This Part recommends that employers revise their harass-
ment and discrimination policies to be more transparent, which 
will also better align with employers’ true litigation risk, and ac-
tual decisionmaking. Harassment policies should be revised to 
provide more information on the types of factors that influence 
employer judgments on the severity of the policy violation. Dis-
crimination policies should be revised to explain that supervisors 
 
 277. Even with narrow definitions of cause such as these, companies could 
still technically fire the executive for harassment without notice. However, do-
ing so could be quite costly. 
 278. Allen Smith, #MeToo Postings About Bosses Merit Discussions with HR, 
SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.shrm.org/ 
resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/employment-law/pages/metoo 
-postings-about-managers.aspx (referencing “zero-tolerance sexual harassment 
policies”). 
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occupy a position of trust with respect to maintaining and imple-
menting the company’s policy of equal employment opportunity. 
When supervisors make disparaging or harassing comments 
based on an employee’s membership in a protected category, the 
policy should explain that it is a breach of that duty of trust, 
which the company takes seriously. This revision aligns with a 
company’s discrimination-related risks, and frames the problem 
in an intuitive way that parallels company ethics policies. 
A. THE PROBLEM WITH HARASSMENT POLICIES 
Harassment policies may have contributed to the problems 
that gave rise to the MeToo movement in ways that employers 
do not recognize. Legal scholar Vicki Schulz has been especially 
critical of harassment policies. In a famous 2003 article, The 
Sanitized Workplace, Vicki Schultz argued that employers 
tended to portray and define harassment primarily in terms of 
sexual conduct.279 Schultz examined scores of employer harass-
ment policies and found that they relied heavily on the EEOC’s 
1980 guidelines, which focused on sexual conduct, rather than 
definitions based on Supreme Court jurisprudence.280 Schultz 
also observed that these policies prohibited a wide range of sex-
ual conduct that might not legally qualify as harassment.281 
Schultz argued that employers have an interest in defining har-
assment as a matter of boorish male behavior282 to avoid ad-
dressing the more challenging question of providing meaningful 
equal employment opportunity in the workplace.283 
Broadly worded policies provide a number of benefits for em-
ployers. First, they give employers considerable flexibility. 
Where a broad swath of conduct technically violated the harass-
ment policy, it gave employers the freedom to punish violations 
depending on the context of the harassment and the employer’s 
willingness to punish or protect the harasser based on business 
preferences. Second, broad policies also enable employers to in-
tervene before the conduct rises to the level of severe or perva-
sive conduct.  
 
 279. Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, supra note 73, at 2065. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at 2067. 
 283. Id.; see also Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 
Again, 128 YALE L.J.F. 22, 43 (2018) (“Highlighting sexual harms . . . can also 
lead victims to underreport nonsexual acts of sex—and gender—based hostil-
ity.”).  
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Third, broad harassment policies help to limit the em-
ployer’s discrimination-related liability. Suppose, for example, 
that a supervisor makes a derogatory comment about a subordi-
nate’s protected status such as their race or gender. Unless the 
comment is an epithet or slur, it will not give rise to a harass-
ment claim. It also will not give rise to a discrimination claim, 
because that would require an adverse employment action, like 
a termination, demotion, or difference in pay.284 However, the 
comment could be extremely damaging for the employer if the 
employee is later fired, demoted, or denied a promotion. A single 
comment could represent smoking gun evidence of the supervi-
sor’s discriminatory intent when they later fire the employee.285 
Thus, broadly worded policies help employers guard against 
comments that might later get the employer in trouble. 
However, broad harassment policies impose hidden costs. 
Both the policies and related training286 routinely encourage em-
ployees to report any policy violation to the company. Victims 
then assume that companies would punish all policy violations, 
when in fact employers discipline selectively and proportionally. 
This information gap leads victims to feel surprised and be-
 
 284. See, e.g., Jones v. Spherion Atl. Enter., LLC 493 F. App’x 6, 9 (11th Cir. 
2012); Mitchell v. Vanderbilt Univ., 389 F.3d 177, 181 (6th Cir. 2004); Herrn-
reiter v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 315 F.3d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 285. See, e.g., Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006) (stating that 
a supervisor’s use of the word boy to refer to African American employee could 
be used as evidence of discriminatory animus); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) (noting that employer’s statements that plaintiff 
should act more femininely was evidence of sex stereotyping); Felix v. Boeing 
Co., 229 F.3d 1157, 1157 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that a supervisor’s past derog-
atory statements regarding Latinos including saying “why would I want an-
other one of them?” was evidence of discrimination); Merritt v. Dillard Paper 
Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1189–90 (11th Cir. 1997) (providing several cases containing 
direct evidence of discrimination); Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 874 
(11th Cir. 1985) (stating that a plant manager’s statement that “half of them 
weren’t worth a shit,” with reference to black women, was direct evidence of 
discriminatory motive); Lilly v. Flagstar Enter., Inc., No. CIV. A. 00-D-1313-E, 
2001 WL 849537, at *2 (M.D. Ala. July 26, 2001) (denying summary judgment 
in sex discrimination claim where supervisor previously made comments like 
“pregnant women are lazy” and that he “hates to terminate males” because 
“they are heads of their household”); see also Silver v. N. Shore Univ. Hosp., 490 
F. Supp. 2d 354, 362–63 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussing the case law on stray re-
marks); Belgrave v. City of New York, No. 95-0CV-1507 (JG), 1999 WL 692034, 
at *29 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 1999) (“Even stray remarks in the workplace by per-
sons who are not involved in the pertinent decision making process . . . may suf-
fice to present a prima facie case provided those remarks evidence invidious 
discrimination.”). 
 286. Tippett, supra note 132. 
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trayed when an apparent violation of the harassment policy pro-
duces no discipline. The employer’s inaction then erodes the 
credibility of the employer’s system, and makes other victims 
less likely to complain. 
Broad harassment policies are not very persuasive. Beyond 
the employer’s failure to enforce them, policies that prohibit wide 
swaths of conduct in an undifferentiated manner start to resem-
ble civility codes. Employees know implicitly that not all of the 
prohibited conduct is equally problematic, which can lead them 
to bristle at the employer’s attempt to control their behavior and 
question the validity of the legal rules. 
In addition, overly broad harassment policies are likely to 
produce avoidance behaviors that discriminate against un-
derrepresented groups.287 The supervisor may decide that the 
best way to avoid inadvertently violating the policy is to avoid 
contact with those who might accuse them of harassment. For 
example, a supervisor might exclude female subordinates from 
business lunches, networking events, or client development op-
portunities. This then limits the employee’s opportunity for ad-
vancement—the supervisor is less familiar with her skill and po-
tential and she receives less coaching and advice. The employee’s 
client base may also suffer, which may limit her compensation 
or prospect for promotion. Consequently, widespread avoidance 
behaviors could give rise to a class action claim for discrimina-
tion.288 
 
 287. Nikki Graf, Sexual Harassment at Work in the Era of #MeToo, PEW 
RES. CTR. (Apr. 4, 2018), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2018/04/04/sexual 
-harassment-at-work-in-the-era-of-metoo (stating that half of respondents be-
lieve MeToo has made it more difficult for men to know how to interact with 
women in the workplace); see also Vicki Schulz, Open Statement on Sexual Har-
assment from Employment Discrimination Law Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 17, 35 (2018) (“Fear of being accused of harassment for benign com-
ments or interactions can also encourage higher-ups to exclude or avoid 
women.”); Tippett, supra note 132 (noting avoidance related risks when harass-
ment trainings make harassment law appear complex and fail to discuss the 
importance of inclusion). 
 288. Where avoidance works to the overall disadvantage of employees on the 
basis of gender, or other protected category, it could serve as the basis for a 
lucrative class action claim. Velez v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 04 Civ. 
09194(CM), 2010 WL 4877852, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2010) (involving 5,600 
female sales employees suing their employer for unequal pay and promotion 
practices); Grant McCool & Jonathan Stempel, Novartis in $175 Million Gender 
Bias Settlement, REUTERS (July 14, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us 
-novartis-settlement/novartis-in-175-million-gender-bias-settlement 
-idUSTRE66D57Z20100714 (discussing the same). Although this case did not 
explicitly involve a failure to mentor female employees, mentorship from men 
would have been necessary to climb up the ranks of a sales organization that 
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In the media, harassment and discrimination tend to be 
placed on opposite sides of a continuum.289 On one end, sexual 
harassment rules are underenforced but men are less fearful of 
interacting with women.290 On the other end, sexual harassment 
is strictly enforced and men hide from women.291 Within this 
frame, the question becomes where to find the balance between 
opposing rights. The frame falsely assumes that workplaces un-
constrained by harassment rules will do a better job of advancing 
women and other underrepresented groups. 
The other end of this false dichotomy is to double down on 
preexisting policies by implementing a zero tolerance rule for 
harassment.292 Zero tolerance is an ambiguous term. It might 
mean that employees will not avoid punishment for their first 
offense. Zero tolerance might also mean that all violations of the 
harassment policy will be treated as equally severe. However, 
this will prove extremely difficult to implement over time. The 
employer will inevitably be confronted with the dilemma of how 
to respond to relatively mild allegations of harassment. Employ-
ers must then choose between an excessively punitive ap-
proach—where punishment exceeds even what the victim might 
have preferred—and unofficial departures from the zero toler-
ance policy. 
 
was largely dominated by men. In addition, the same theory and legal claims at 
issue in the Novartis case could be readily applied to a context where men, es-
pecially highly placed men, stop mentoring women. 
 289. Compare Clare Cain Miller, Unintended Consequences of Sexual Har-
assment Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/ 
09/upshot/as-sexual-harassment-scandals-spook-men-it-can-backfire-for 
-women.html (describing avoidance behaviors as a result of harassment fears), 
with 223 Women Speak Out Against Sexual Harassment in National Security 
Field, CBS NEWS (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/223-women 
-say-theyre-survivors-of-sexual-harassment-in-national-security-field (women 
describe rampant harassment in national security realm). 
 290. Tolerating harassment does not necessarily work to the advantage of 
women in the workplace. Many of the industries where harassment was re-
vealed to be most rampant or most tolerated were industries that were male 
dominated or where men occupied the top rungs of the organization. While male 
fears around harassment may disadvantage women, tolerating harassment is 
no fix. 
 291. Schultz, supra note 283, at 60 (noting that “sex segregation is a cause 
of—and not a solution to—sexual harassment”). 
 292. Jonathan Brock et al., What Exactly Is Zero Tolerance on Sexual Har-
assment?, BOST. GLOBE (Jan. 2 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/ 
2018/01/02/what-exactly-zero-tolerance-sexual-harassment/3mKqMjzMDll3UZ 
qgWoXu7N/story.html; Erin Gloria Ryan, When #MeToo Becomes #YouToo, 
DAILY BEAST (Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.thedailybeast.com/when-metoo 
-becomes-youtoo. 
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B. THE PROBLEM WITH DISCRIMINATION POLICIES 
Discrimination policies tend to be drafted to mirror legal 
rules. They prohibit employment decisions that are based on an 
employee’s membership in a protected category. Unlike harass-
ment policies, they do not provide space for an employer to inter-
vene before an actual discrimination claim arises. This produces 
two big gaps with respect to advancing equal employment oppor-
tunity in the workplace. First, it does not address the denial of 
smaller workplace opportunities that could add up over time. 
Consider, for example, the story of Susan Fowler’s viral com-
plaints at Uber.293 Although they included claims of harass-
ment—in particular a proposition from her supervisor—they 
also included numerous examples of low level discrimination—a 
leather jacket denied to female engineers, a transfer denial that 
may have been partly motivated by discrimination.294 Human 
resources proved unresponsive, and apparently suggested that 
Fowler herself may have been the source of the problem.295 While 
it might be easy to attribute Fowler’s story to the culture at 
Uber, her experience with human resources may have reflected 
a crimped discrimination policy that overlooked discrimination 
that did not yet exceed the legal threshold. 
Second, current discrimination policies fail to capture dis-
criminatory comments unaccompanied by an adverse employ-
ment action. As previously noted, this leaves the employer ex-
posed if the same supervisor later denies a promotion to the 
affected employee or terminates their employment. 
C. A BETTER APPROACH 
Ultimately, it is a mistake to assume the problem is an in-
herent conflict between harassment and discrimination law, 
where one must be chosen at the expense of another. Rather, the 
problem is the gap between employers’ actual practice, and their 
stated policy. Employers need to be more transparent about how 
their harassment policies are applied, and the contextual factors 
that influence their decisionmaking. They should also stop using 
harassment policies as a pretext to reduce discrimination-re-
lated liability, and instead craft broader discrimination policies. 
 
 293. Reflecting on One Very, Very Strange Year at Uber, SUSAN FOWLER 
(Feb. 19, 2017), https://www.susanjfowler.com/blog/2017/2/19/reflecting-on-one 
-very-strange-year-at-uber (discussing harassment and discrimination experi-
enced at Uber). 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
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This will bring both policies closer to employer practices, and 
better advance the broader goals of both harassment and dis-
crimination law. These changes will also render the policies 
more credible and persuasive to employees. 
A more transparent harassment policy could still define har-
assment relatively broadly. (See Appendix.) However, this policy 
would also explain the contextual factors296 that influence its 
judgments when applying the policy and meting out punish-
ment. The company could explain, for example, that harassment 
by supervisors, and especially high ranking employees, will be 
treated as proportionally more serious,297 given the ways in 
which power differences can limit the victim’s ability to engage 
in self-help measures. It could also explain that violence, assault, 
and threats of violence will be presumed to be extremely serious 
as an employment matter,298 and may result in a call to the po-
lice. Serious misconduct should include hostile acts that could be 
 
 296. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998) 
(stating that “the real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a 
constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships 
which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the 
physical acts performed” and judging those behaviors requires “common sense, 
and an appropriate sensitivity to social context”). 
 297. Boyer-Liberto v. Fountainbleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 280 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(accepting argument that supervisor’s use of a racial slur along with “explicit, 
angry threats . . . to terminate [plaintiff ’ s] employment” was especially threat-
ening); Quantock v. Shared Mktg. Servs., Inc., 312 F.3d 899, 904 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that repeated propositions from boss met the standard for a sexual har-
assment claim); Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 926 n.9 (9th Cir. 
2000) (stating that a coworker groping another coworker is insufficient to satisfy 
the severe or pervasive standard, but assault by supervisor may well be suffi-
cient); Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d 1104, 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 
1998) (discussing how repeated comments from a supervisor could satisfy a har-
assment claim); Venter v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 976 (7th Cir. 1997) (hold-
ing that persistent proselytizing by a supervisor made the working environment 
hostile and abusive); Robles v. Agreserves, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 3d 952, 984 (E.D. 
Cal. 2016) (holding that repeated comments denigrating religion by foreman 
were sufficiently severe and pervasive to constitute harassment). 
 298. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (opining that the 
severity or pervasiveness of conduct depend upon “the frequency of the discrim-
inatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating 
or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an 
employee’s work performance”); Fuller v. Idaho Dept. of Corr., 865 F.3d 1154, 
1162–64 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that sexual assault coupled with the agency’s 
internal endorsements of such actions created a hostile work environment); 
Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., 668 F.3d 182, 184 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Deliberate and 
unwanted touching of intimate body parts can constitute severe sexual harass-
ment.”); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that a grad-
ual escalation of conduct, including increasingly disturbing letters may be con-
sidered sexual harassment). 
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experienced as threatening to employees on the basis of gender, 
race, religion, national origin, disability, and other protected cat-
egories. This might include for example, epithets and slurs, as 
well as symbolic acts like a noose, blackface, swastikas, vandal-
ism, or maliciously damaging an employee’s property or car.299 
The company could also explain factors that may influence its 
determination of the severity or frequency300 of the conduct, such 
as the work environment and surroundings, whether the conduct 
was humiliating or degrading,301 and disregarding attempts by 
the victim or others to stop or avoid the conduct. Employers could 
reserve the right to terminate employees for serious incidents of 
misconduct not specifically enumerated in the policy, in their 
sole discretion. The employer could also consult employees in 
crafting the language to ensure that it is consistent with their 
assessments of proportionality. 
This approach brings employer policies regarding discipline 
more in line with the actual legal standards for evaluating har-
assment claims. The legal standards offer the benefit of being 
 
 299. See, e.g., Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 280 (holding that racial slurs could 
create a hostile work environment); EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 
306, 316 (4th Cir. 2008) (referring to coworker as “Taliban,” “towel head,” and 
asking “are you on our side or are you on the Taliban’s side” constituted harass-
ment); Tademy v. Union Pac. Corp., 614 F.3d 1132, 1132 (10th Cir. 2008) (hold-
ing that a noose incident and racial epithets created a hostile work environ-
ment); Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1989) 
(holding that hanging a noose over an employee’s workstation created a hostile 
and abusive work environment); Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1098 
(2d Cir. 1986) (finding that posting a photo of a noose, posting KKK information, 
and locking coworkers out of the bathroom created a hostile work environment); 
Collins v. Exec. Airlines, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 1378, 1381 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (exposing 
an employee to a noose and blackface created a hostile work environment); 
Garcez v. Freightliner Corp., 72 P.3d 78, 85–86 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that 
a coworker’s use of racial epithets and property destruction created a hostile 
work environment).  
 300. Freeman v. Dal-Tile Corp., 750 F.3d 413, 417, 422 (4th Cir. 2014) (find-
ing that a coworker’s frequent gender-derogatory language, sexual comments, 
and racial comments constituted harassment); Reeves v. C.H. Robinson World-
wide, 594 F.3d 798, 804, 811 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that a “substantial corpus 
of gender-derogatory language” used nearly every day by coworkers created an 
abusive work environment); Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 150–51 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (stating that routine anti-Semitic remarks by coworkers created a 
hostile work environment). 
 301. Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993); Turley v. ISG Lacka-
wanna, Inc., 774 F.3d 140, 146 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding that a “steadily intensify-
ing drumbeat of racial insults, intimidation, and degradation over a period of 
more than three years” constituted harassment); Draper, 147 F.3d at 1105–06 
(finding that repeated comments from a supervisor over a two year period, in-
cluding one over a loudspeaker, created a hostile work environment). 
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proportional and contextual, and the result of decades of consid-
eration. These contextual factors likely appeal to employees’ in-
nate sense of justice and proportionality. Second, it brings the 
policy closer to how employers actually evaluate harassment 
complaints.302 While employers might prohibit everything on pa-
per, and the paper trail might minimize the severity of the con-
duct, the actual standard they use for imposing discipline looks 
closer to the legal standard. This will continue to be true even in 
a broader context where employers take a more punitive ap-
proach than in the past. Articulating those standards makes the 
employer’s policy more transparent, which serves the expecta-
tions of both victims and the accused. 
A more transparent harassment policy will, upon close in-
spection, reveal that less serious incidents of harassment—like 
comments about an employee’s membership in a protected cate-
gory—do not represent the most serious forms of harassment. 
While these comments could be harassment, they should be han-
dled within the context of a broader discrimination policy. 
Discrimination policies present an opportunity to explain 
the significance of such comments in a way that will be mean-
ingful to employees. The policy could explain, for example, that 
supervisors occupy a position of trust in the organization.303 (See 
Appendix.) They are entrusted with providing opportunities for 
advancement equally among those who report to them, without 
regard to their membership in a protected category. It is analo-
gous to an employee entrusted to handle large sums of money on 
 
 302. Of course, articulating the circumstances that influence disciplinary de-
cisions is not without risk; specifically mentioning some types of misconduct 
necessarily leaves others out. While including a disclaimer is helpful, there is 
nevertheless a risk of a breach of implied-in-fact contract claim if the employer 
departs from its articulated standard. 
 303. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2015) 
(“Employees in a position of trust and confidence with their employer owe a 
fiduciary duty of loyalty to the employer in matters related to their employ-
ment.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An 
agent has a duty to the principal to use care in acting on the principal’s behalf.”); 
Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fi-
duciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1628–30 (discussing the fiduciary du-
ties of corporate officers); Joseph T. Walsh, The Fiduciary Foundation of Corpo-
rate Law, 27 J. CORP. L. 333, 333 (2002) (“The fiduciary concept . . . had its 
origin in the law of trusts, where its literal meaning—faithfulness—correctly 
described the duty of responsibility owed by one who held title, but not owner-
ship, to property of another.”). 
  
296 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:229 
 
the employer’s behalf, which imposes special responsibilities re-
garding how that money should be handled.304 Part of upholding 
that trust means devoting care and attention to how they dis-
tribute formal and informal opportunities for advancement. It 
also means refraining from making comments or engaging in 
conduct that would cast doubt on their impartiality. When a su-
pervisor makes denigrating comments about a subordinate’s 
gender, race, or religion, it suggests they are not giving everyone 
an equal shot. The same is true if they do nothing to address 
discriminatory comments on the part of an employee’s cowork-
ers. Where a supervisor violates that duty of trust, it is proper 
for the employer to discipline them, which may even mean re-
moving them from their decisionmaking role. 
Framing discrimination as a breach of trust also aligns with 
the way companies structure their code of ethics and conflict of 
interest policies.305 Employees that represent the company with 
respect to third parties have a special duty of trust to maintain 
the company’s image and project the employer’s values with re-
spect to honesty and integrity. Employees intuitively under-
stand that paying a bribe to a government official, no matter how 
small, could be extremely damaging to the company’s legal in-
terests and integrity.306 Likewise, employees also understand 
the notion that dishonest conduct, for example a false claim for 
reimbursement or misuse of the company’s credit card, is ex-
tremely problematic not just because of the amount of money at 
 
 304. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRS. § 174 (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (“The trus-
tee is under a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to exercise such 
care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his 
own property.”); John Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 
105 YALE L.J. 625, 656 (1995) (discussing the duty of prudent administration). 
 305. ORACLE CODE OF ETHICS AND BUSINESS CONDUCT (2017), www 
.oracle.com/us/corporate/investor-relations/cebc-176732.pdf (“The term ‘conflict 
of interest’ describes any circumstance that could cast doubt on your ability to 
act in Oracle’s best interests and to exercise sound business judgment un-
clouded by personal interest or divided loyalties.”); Code of Ethics and Business 
Conduct, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Jun. 18, 2018), https://webcache 
.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:wvBF8ZAmctgJ:https://www.shrm 
.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/policies/pages/cms_014093.aspx (“We 
must avoid any relationship or activity that might impair, or even appear to 
impair, our ability to make objective and fair decisions when performing our 
jobs.”). 
 306. The Kraft Heinz Company Employee Code of Conduct, KRAFTHEINZ 
(Aug. 19, 2015), www.kraftheinzcompany.com/ethics_and_compliance/code-of 
-conduct.html (“We are strictly prohibited from directly or indirectly giving, of-
fering, promising, or authorizing anything of value—no matter how small—to 
any government official or agency . . . or any other individual to corruptly secure 
a business advantage.”). 
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issue, but because it raises serious questions about future con-
duct. The same is true in the discrimination context. 
Although codes of conduct often reference discrimination 
and harassment, they tend not to be framed in terms of integrity 
and breach of a duty of trust. Instead, discrimination is charac-
terized as something the company “doesn’t” do.307 Likewise, har-
assment is framed as disrespectful,308 or as a productivity drag 
due to decreased interpersonal trust.309 Instead, codes of conduct 
should explain that a supervisor’s discriminatory conduct casts 
doubt on their ability to make future employment decisions. If 
that supervisor is later permitted to decide which employees to 
promote, for example, that comment could qualify as a smoking 
gun of the supervisor’s discriminatory intent. The policy should 
explain that it is therefore proper for the employer to intervene 
before the supervisor’s decision is tainted by the discriminatory 
comment. That intervention need not necessarily be excessively 
punitive when compared to the conduct at issue. But it should be 
adequate to remove any doubt as to the fairness of later employ-
ment decisions relating to the employees affected by the com-
ment. 
Such a policy would help limit an employer’s liability. But it 
also places the conduct within its correct context. The employer 
 
 307. ORACLE, supra note 305 (“The term ‘conflict of interest’ describes any 
circumstance that could cast doubt on your ability to act in Oracle’s best inter-
ests and to exercise sound business judgment unclouded by personal interest or 
divided loyalties”); Code of Ethics and Business Conduct, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RE-
SOURCE MGMT., supra note 305 (“[Company name] is an equal employment/af-
firmative action employer and is committed to providing a workplace that is free 
of discrimination of all types from abuse, offensive or harassing behavior.”). 
 308. PG&E, supra note 263 (“Conduct yourself in a professional manner and 
treat others with respect, fairness and dignity.”); KRAFTHEINZ, supra note 306 
(“Keep interactions with your fellow employees professional and respectful.”); 
Code of Conduct, VERIZON, https://www.verizon.com/about/sites/default/files/ 
Verizon-Code-of-Conduct.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2018) (“We know it is critical 
that we respect everyone at every level of our business. We champion diversity, 
embrace individuality and listen carefully when others speak.”).  
 309. Code of Ethics and Business Conduct, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE 
MGMT., supra note 305 (“We all deserve to work in an environment where we 
are treated with dignity and respect. [Company name] is committed to creating 
such an environment because it brings out the full potential in each of us, which, 
in turn, contributes directly to our business success.”); OWENS CORNING, OW-
ENS CORNING CODE OF CONDUCT, https://dcpd6wotaa0mb.cloudfront.net/ 
owenscorning.com/assets/sustainability/Owens_Corning_Code_of_Conduct 
-d77192c66ff4c26dd9a5c0de973be65332700c676cb4f9334fc687564f237c34.pdf 
(“We depend on each other’s knowledge and support, so it is especially im-
portant to treat our fellow employees with respect and dignity. Harassing be-
havior creates an uncomfortable workplace where people don’t trust each 
other—which keeps us from reaching our goals.”).  
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is not intervening out of concern for overly sensitive employees, 
nor is it seeking to regulate speech. Instead, it is protecting the 
integrity of the decisionmaking process for all employees. 
  CONCLUSION   
The MeToo movement is still unfolding, and may yet lead to 
even broader changes than those currently described here. These 
include examinations of pay equity, paid leave, and discrimina-
tion against those with caregiving responsibilities. It may also 
lead to additional innovations in employee practices, fueled by a 
tech industry ready to test new approaches with real time ana-
lytics. 
Employer practices will continue to be negotiated and re-
vised. Because prior systems of interlocking employment policies 
and practices were so entrenched, changing one policy or prac-
tice inevitably affects the implementation of others. Shifting cul-
tural expectations may also produce a backlash, which will like-
wise demand an employer response. 
Legal rules will both lead and follow changes in employer 
practices. Restrictions on settlement agreements will change 
contracting practices, employer litigation, and settlement strat-
egies. On the other hand, if legislators fail to act, employers will 
likely seize the opportunity to expand social media policies and 
their use of arbitration agreements. 
Nevertheless, disruption can be fruitful. Ultimately, the Me-
Too movement injects democracy into the workplace, by pushing 
employers toward transparency and accountability. Without se-
crecy for cover, employers must finally show their work, and fig-
ure out what it means in practice to provide everyone with an 
equal opportunity to succeed.  
  
2018] LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF METOO 299 
 
APPENDIX – MODEL POLICIES 
HARASSMENT POLICY 
Federal and state law protects an employee’s right to work 
in an environment that is free of harassment. Under the law, the 
term “harassment” means offensive comments or conduct di-
rected at an employee because of their membership in a pro-
tected category, like their gender, race, color, religion, national 
origin, disability, age, or veteran status. State law also protects 
employees against harassment based on [insert additional state 
law protections].310 
To satisfy the legal standard for harassment, the offensive 
conduct must be so severe or frequent that it has the effect of 
altering the employee’s work environment. In other words, the 
work environment would need to be very bad for someone to win 
a court case. 
A very bad work environment is a low bar. We hold our-
selves—and you—to higher standards. We strive to create a 
work environment where employees can focus on their job, with-
out being pigeonholed, judged based on stereotypes, or con-
stantly reminded that they are different. Our workplace also pri-
oritizes inclusion, where everyone has a chance to make 
important work connections, gain valuable experience, and take 
on challenging opportunities. 
Our policy prohibits harassing conduct, even if it is not se-
vere or frequent enough to meet the legal standard. Don’t make 
jokes or comments that mock or denigrate others based on their 
background or status. Don’t post derogatory or demeaning ma-
terial in your physical workspace, on your computer, or over 
email (and consider how your behavior online might bleed into 
the workplace). Offensive physical contact, leering, and blocking 
other people’s movement are also unacceptable. 
When assessing your own behavior, consider how your com-
ments—along with comments from others—might add up over 
time. For example, a few casual comments to a pregnant woman 
about her size might seem isolated to you. But if everyone does 
it, that means she’s hearing a constant stream of comments, to 
the exclusion of work-related discussions or enjoyable small talk 
unrelated to her appearance. The same thing goes for casual 
comments motivated by someone’s religion, race or disability, for 
 
 310. Brackets refer to information for the employer to complete. 
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example. Constantly reminding someone that you are hyper-fo-
cused on how they are different is probably not going to help 
them succeed in the workplace. 
Sexual conduct may violate the harassment policy, espe-
cially when it involves employees in authority positions. Employ-
ees deserve to be able to focus on their job, without having to 
fend off the advances of others they can’t readily avoid. Employ-
ees also shouldn’t have to worry about the awkwardness of how 
their boss will respond to being rebuffed. Or whether their su-
pervisor views them as an object, instead of recognizing their 
productivity and potential. Sexual conduct can also be a form of 
harassment where it is used to marginalize or punish others, 
even those of the same gender. 
If you have experienced harassment, please do not suffer in 
silence. Reporting the behavior enables us to help put a stop to 
the behavior, and ensure that others are not affected as well. You 
can report harassment to [your supervisor, human re-
sources . . . insert other reporting options]. 
We investigate reports of harassment we receive, unless the 
complainant requests that we do not investigate. (The absence 
of an investigation may limit our ability to respond. Conse-
quently, we may independently decide to investigate harassment 
involving allegations of serious or widespread harassment.) In-
vestigations usually consist of interviewing the complainant, the 
person accused of harassment, and any others identified as wit-
nesses. We may also collect relevant documents, like emails or 
text messages. In cases involving violence, assault, rape, or 
threats of violence, we may also contact law enforcement. 
If we determine a harassment complaint is substantiated, 
we will then decide how to stop the conduct, as well as hold the 
employee who violated the policy accountable. Our disciplinary 
decisions generally reflect the seriousness of the policy violation. 
A minor violation of the harassment policy might mean talk-
ing with the employee about his or her behavior and why it is a 
problem. More serious violations of the policy could mean imme-
diate termination, or other serious forms of discipline that re-
duce the employee’s rank, responsibilities, compensation, or per-
formance evaluation. 
Some of the factors that tend to bear upon the seriousness 
of a harassment claim include: (1) whether the harassment in-
volved physical contact; (2) whether the conduct involved epi-
thets or slurs; (3) whether the conduct involved symbolically of-
fensive or threatening acts, such as swastikas or a noose; (4) 
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whether the conduct involved vandalism or damage to property; 
(5) whether the conduct was humiliating or degrading; (6) 
whether the conduct limited the victim’s access to work opportu-
nities or tools needed to perform his/her job; (7) the physical en-
vironment in which the harassment occurred; (8) the social con-
text in which the harassment occurred; (9) whether the conduct 
was repeated. 
As with all disciplinary matters, we ultimately reserve the 
discretion to decide whether and how to discipline employees. 
Common sense, fairness, and business exigencies may dictate 
that we make decisions regarding harassment not specifically 
set forth in this policy. 
DISCRIMINATION POLICY 
Under federal and state law, employees have the right to 
equal opportunity when it comes to important employment deci-
sions like hiring, promotion, pay, or termination decisions. That 
means that these decisions cannot be motivated by an em-
ployee’s gender, race, religion, national origin, age, disability, 
color or veteran status. State law also protects employees on the 
basis of [insert state law protections]. 
However, we hold ourselves to a higher standard than the 
legal rules require. We expect supervisors to show a high degree 
of integrity in distributing both formal and informal workplace 
opportunities. This means taking care to ensure equal oppor-
tunity in areas like networking opportunities, challenging as-
signments, training opportunities, mentoring, client engage-
ment, and other similar opportunities that affect an employee’ 
career trajectory over time. 
In our company, supervisors hold a special position of trust 
to maintain the integrity of these employment decisions. They 
breach that duty of trust when they engage in conduct or com-
ments that raise serious questions about their ability or willing-
ness to provide opportunities on an equal basis. In particular, 
derogatory or demeaning comments about an employee’s reli-
gion, disability, gender, age, race or other legally protected sta-
tus, suggest that supervisor cannot be trusted to provide a level 
playing field. Other harassing behavior by a supervisor may 
raise similar questions about the supervisor’s integrity regard-
ing the discrimination policy. In other words, even a minor vio-
lation of the company’s harassment policy by a supervisor may 
be a serious violation of the company’s discrimination policy. 
  
302 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:229 
 
If you have experienced discrimination, or have questions 
about the integrity of the decisionmaking process, please let us 
know. Reporting at an early stage can help us fix the process and 
restore trust before the stakes get even higher. You can contact 
human resources [insert any other reporting options]. 
We will then investigate the situation, which generally con-
sists of interviewing you, interviewing the supervisor, and re-
viewing relevant documents, including documents bearing on 
the decision-making process, if any. If a complaint is substanti-
ated, we will then assess how to remediate the situation, address 
the supervisor’s breach of trust (if applicable), and improve the 
decisionmaking process. 
RETALIATION POLICY 
Employees perform a valuable service to the company by 
bringing important information to our attention through [their 
supervisor or to HR].311 We also recognize that it takes courage 
to formally report harassment, discrimination or other unlawful 
conduct. 
Encouraging employees to use and trust our complaint sys-
tem demands that supervisors and coworkers support those who 
have used the complaint system. Retaliation against another 
employee for using our complaint system is strictly prohibited. 
 
 311. This language should parallel earlier language about how to report a 
harassment complaint. 
